NOTE:  THIS IS A WORKING DRAFT FOR COMMENT, AND IS PART OF THE AWOL PROJECT, A LARGE SERIES OF ARTICLES EXAMINING BUSH’S MILITARY RECORDS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE FEDERAL STATUTES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REGULATIONS, AND AIR FORCE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF THAT ERA. 

 

COMMENTS, CORRECTIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISIONS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO awol@glcq.com. 

 

 

FRAUD

The Secrets of Bush’s Payroll Records Revealed

 

SUMMARY

 

On February 10, 2004, the White House released George W Bush’s quarterly payroll summaries for his last year in the Texas Air National Guard, claiming that they proved that Bush had “fulfilled his duties” as a member of the US Armed Forces.  However, An examination of these records within the context of laws and policies of that time reveals that at least half (and as much as two thirds) of the pay and “points” credited toward Bush’s mandatory monthly training were fraudulent.  When one deducts these fraudulent points from Bush’s records, Bush does not achieve the minimum number of points under the White House’s own (erroneous) criteria.

 

It is likely that the White House is unaware of what the payroll records reveal, because the most damning information is buried in lines of “incomprehensible” data found at the bottom of the payroll reports.  This article breaks that code, and shows that Bush repeatedly claimed credit and pay for performing “substitute training” for mandatory monthly drills with his unit that was well outside the time limits set for “substitute training.  And although he was required to get advance authorization for all training, the public record shows that  Bush could not have received the necessary authorizations for “training” performed in Alabama .

 

 

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

UTAs AND SUBSTITUTE DUTY

CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND BUSH’S CONTROL?

TIME LIMITS FOR  SUBSTITUTE TRAINING

FRAUDULENT PAY AND CREDIT FOR “SUBSTITUTE TRAINING”

PAY DATES, AND FRAUD

PAY AND POINT FRAUD, AND THE WHITE HOUSE CRITERIA FOR “SATISFACTORY PARTICIPATION”

THE NON-EXISTENT PAPER TRAIL

THE QUESTION OF UNAUTHORIZED TRAINING

            The “Substitute Training” for March UTAs

          The “Substitute Training” for January and February UTAs

          The Statements of Alabama Officials

CONCLUSIONS

APPENDIX 1: THE PURPOSE OF “UNIT TRAINING”, AND “SUBSTITUTE TRAINING”

APPENDIX 2: UNDERSTANDING THE PAYROLL DATA

            UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSACTION DATA LINES

            UNDERSTANDING THE "TRANSACTION INFORMATION"  SECTION

APPENDIX 3 THE PAPER TRAIL FOR NON-EXISTENT TRAINING

APPENDIX 4:  THE APRIL MYSTERY

APPENDIX 5--ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS FROM THE PAYROLL RECORDS

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

A great deal of attention has been paid to the payroll records of George W. Bush of late.   Most of that attention has been based on whether or not Bush was credited with, and paid for, sufficient training to meet the requirements of the United States Armed Forces. No attention has been given to whether or not the “points” and pay were legitimate.

 

An examination of the payroll records, within the context of the laws and policies concerning pay and credit for mandatory monthly training, shows that up to two thirds of the payments and points Bush received in his last year as a member of the Texas Air National Guard (TXANG) were fraudulent.

 

This article will explain what the policies were, what the payroll records reveal, and how it was impossible for Bush to legitimately receive the credit and pay for the “training” he supposed performed.  It will also explore the ways in which these payroll records interface both with other documents in the Bush files and with public statements made by individuals who were involved in this controversy, and demonstrate how there is only one conclusion to be drawn from these records.

 

George W. Bush committed fraud in claiming credit and pay for most of the “training” he supposedly did in his last twelve months as a member of the Air National Guard.

 

 

 

BACKGROUND

 

Under Federal statutes[1], Department of Defense regulations, and Air Force policy, all Air National Guard (ANG) units were required to hold scheduled drills (Unit Training Assemblies or UTAs) once weekend each month.  Each weekend consisted of four, four-hour UTAs, two on Saturday and two on Sunday. (See Appendix 1:  The Purpose of “Unit Training” and “Substitute Training”)

 

From CFR Title 32, Chapter 101 Sec 3(b)

 

ANG members were paid, and received one “point”, for performance of each UTA.  If a member was unable to attend these mandatory monthly training periods, he could receive pay and “UTA points” by peforming “substitute training.”  These points were the basis for determining if ANG members were fulfilling their participation requirements set by Federal law.

 

As a pilot with a six year “Military Service Obligation” (MSO) George W. Bush was required by law to attend at least 90% of these training weekends, or perform authorized “substitute training.”  Failure to participate in the required training would result in Bush losing his draft deferment, and being required to go on active duty for up to 24 months. 

 

(For a fully referenced, footnoted, and detailed explanation of Bush’s attendance obligations as a member of the Air National Guard, see  BUSH'S ATTENDANCE OBLIGATIONS AS A MEMBER OF THE US MILITARY. )

 

UTAs AND SUBSTITUTE DUTY

 

From AFM 35-3, Chapter 2, Para 2-22(b)

 

Although there were two different “types” of “substitute training” for missed UTAs, the only difference between the two was the reason for authorizing the “substitute training”.. 

 

The two types of “substitute training” were  “Equivalent Training” (EQT), which could be authorized only if an ANG member was on active duty at the time of a scheduled UTA, and “Appropriate Duty” (APDY), which could be authorized “when absence is from cause beyond their control, such as illness or other personal hardship”.[2] 

 

AFM 35-3  Table 16-3 “Authorizing and Performing APDY or EQT…”

 


 

 


In order to receive credit for  substitute training, it had to be “authorized in advance by competent authority”.  (“INACDUTRA” stands for “Inactive Duty Training”, or training that was not done while on “active duty”.  This included UTAs, APDYs, and EQTs)

 

CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND BUSH’S CONTROL?

 

The payroll records show that, during his last year as a member of TXANG, Bush missed 2/3 of his mandatory UTAs, and performed substitute duty instead.  These records also show that Bush was not on active duty at any time when mandatory training was scheduled.   Thus, Bush must have claimed that circumstances beyond his control prevented him from attending eight of his last twelve mandatory training weekends.

 

Based on claims made by the White House, “substitute training” was performed in Alabama for six of the eight weekends Bush failed to attend mandatory weekend training with his TXANG unit.  Because UTAs were designed to ensure that Air National Guard units could function as units if called to active duty (see Appendix 1),  Bush had to have claimed that “circumstances beyond his control” prevented him from performing the “substitute training” with his own unit. 

 

Yet there is no known reason why Bush was unable to attend UTAs with his TXANG unit for five months (December 1972, and January, February, March and August, 1973).  Nor is there any known reason why Bush needed to perform “substitute training” in Alabama for four of those five months.  Most significantly, there is no known reason why Bush needed to perform substitute training in Alabama in January 1973 for UTAs with his TXANG unit that were scheduled for February and March.

 

Without a good reason for missing his mandatory monthly training, Bush could not receive prior authorization to perform “substitute training”.  Table 1 shows the extent to which there are serious questions with regard to the need for Bush to perform “substitute training”.

 

Table 1:  Possible explanations for Performance of  substitute training

Date of scheduled UTA

Date of training credited toward UTA

Substitute Training?

Where White House Claims “substitute training” Was Done

Possible Reason for Substitute Training

10/14/72

10/28/72

Yes

Alabama

Working on a Campaign

11/04/72

11/11/72

Yes

Alabama

Working on a Campaign

12/02/72

11/13/72

Yes

Alabama

????

01/13/73

01/04/73

Yes

Alabama

????

02/10/73

01/06/73

Yes

Alabama

????

03/10/73

01/09/73

Yes

Alabama

????

04/07/73

04/07/73

???*

????

????

05/19/73

05/19/73

NO

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

06/23/73

06/23/73

NO

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

07/21/73

07/21/73

NO

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

08/18/73

07/16/73

Yes

Texas

????

09/22/73

07/18/73

Yes

Texas

Classes at Harvard

* Although Bush is credited with UTA performance on the date of his scheduled UTA, Bush's officers claim that he was "not observed" at Ellington AFB on these dates.  See Appendix 4

 


 

 


Except from Bush’s Discharge Form dated 10-1-73

 

Although there is no known reason why Bush needed to perform “substitute training” in five out of his last twelve months as a member of TXANG, we can eliminate one such “circumstance”, based on Bush’s discharge papers.   Employment could not have interfered with Bush’s training, because, according to those papers, Bush’s last civilian job was in “Campaign Management” in Alabama. 

 

We also know that the problem was not a sudden illness or other emergency, because the  “substitute training” for these five months was performed before the dates for which the UTAs were scheduled.  And although it is possible that Bush had “things to do” on the scheduled UTA weekends in December, 1972 and January, February and March, 1973, there is no explanation why Bush did not perform “substitute training” with his own unit for those months, rather than “train” in Alabama.

 

 

TIME LIMITS FOR SUBSTITUTE TRAINING

 

In addition to limitations on the reasons why “substitute training” could be authorized, there were also restrictions on when “substitute training” could be performed.

 

Detail from AFM 35-3  Table 16-3

 

Under Air Force policy[3], all  “substitute training” had to be performed “within 15 days immediately before or 30 days immediately after the regularly scheduled UTA…” 

 

Despite this restriction, more than 60% of the training credited as “substitute training” for UTAs was done more than 15 days before “the regularly scheduled UTA”..

 

FRAUDULENT PAY AND CREDIT FOR “SUBSTITUTE TRAINING”

 

An examination of the payroll transaction data shows that, of the 48 UTA periods for which Bush received credit, at least 32 were for “substitute training”, and at least 20 of these periods of training were performed more than 15 days in advance of the scheduled UTA, in violation of Air Force Policy.  (See Appendix 2:  Understanding the Payroll Data for an explanation of how the payroll data reveals this information.)

 

Table 2 compares the dates on which the payroll data shows that TXANG UTA weekends were scheduled for Bush’s unit in TXANG, and the first of two consecutive days[4] on which “substitute training” was supposedly performed.  (Each weekend consisted of four UTAs.)

 

TABLE 2:  UTA Weekend Scheduled, and Date Training was “Performed”

Date of scheduled UTA weekend

First day of training credited toward UTA

Number of days training was performed in advance

10/14/72

10/28/72

-14*

11/04/72

11/11/72

-7*

12/02/72

11/13/72

19

01/13/73

01/04/73

9

02/10/73

01/06/73

35

03/10/73

01/09/73

60

04/07/73

04/07/73

0

05/19/73

05/19/73

0

06/23/73

06/23/73

0

07/21/73

07/21/73

0

08/18/73

07/16/73

33

09/22/73

07/18/73

66

*Bush performed "substitute training" for Oct. and Nov. 1972 after the dates of corresponding scheduled UTAs

 

The “gray shaded” rows show the times where “ substitute training” was performed more than 15 days in advanced of the scheduled UTAs.  For December, 1972 UTAs,  “substitute training” was performed 19 days in advance, for February, 1973 UTAs, 35 days in advance, for March, 60 days in advance, for August 33 days in advance, and for September, 66 days in advance.  (The negative numbers for October and November 1972 indicate that “substitute training” was supposedly performed 14 days and 7 days after the scheduled UTAs respectively for those months. )

 

This is clear and unequivocal evidence of fraud.  Under Air Force policy, Bush could not receive permission for “substitute training” done more than 15 days in advance of scheduled UTAs.  Yet the payroll records show that he was paid for performing  “substitute training” supposedly performed more than 15 days in advance for five different months of UTAs, four of which were supposedly performed 33 days or more in advance.

 

This data, however, does not provide any information regarding how the fraud was accomplished.  There are three possible “explanations”:

 

1)     The hierarchies of both the Texas Air National Guard and the Alabama Air National Guard ignored Air Force policy, and authorized substitute training that would be done more than 15 days in advance of the corresponding scheduled training.

2)     Fraudulent/forged documents were created, attesting to the advance approval and performance of substitute training in Alabama, and submitted for payment to TXANG. 

3)     Bush was paid for substitute training performed in Alabama without the required documents showing that the training was approved in advance, and certifying that the training had been accomplished.

 

Evidence from the payroll records, as well as other circumstantial evidence, make it extremely unlikely that the “substitute training” was properly authorized.   It is also unlikely that documents were forged and submitted, because Air Force policies and procedures would have made detection of the forgeries easy and inevitable.

 

Thus, the likeliest explanation for Bush fraudulently receiving pay and credit for “substitute training” is that TXANG officials arranged to have Bush credited with training without the necessary authorizations and paperwork.

 

 

PAY DATES, AND FRAUD

 

In addition to showing that much of the pay and “point credit” that Bush received was fraudulent, the payroll records also provide compelling evidence that the “substitute training” was never authorized in advance, and quite possibly never accomplished.

 

The payroll records show that when Bush trained with his TXANG unit, he was always paid for training within one month of the training being accomplished. 

 

From  AFM 35-3  Chapter 20, Para 12

 

Under the procedures established for the performance of “substitute training” with a unit other than a Reservist’s assigned unit, the paperwork certifying that the training had been accomplished had to be sent to the unit of assignment within 48 hours of that training.   Thus, if this training had been authorized in advance, it should have taken no more than an extra week to get paid for the training.

 

Yet, Bush was not paid for the “substitute training” he supposedly performed on October 28 and 29, 1972 until January 4, 1973.   On that same date (and with the same check) Bush was also paid for duty on November 11-14, 1972.  It took over nine weeks (67 days) for Bush to be paid for the October duty, and over seven weeks (51 days) for the November duty.

 

Table 3 lists the dates on which UTA or “substitute training” was supposedly performed, and the dates on which a check was (presumably) cut, for all “transactions” that can be deciphered in the payroll records, and the number of days it took Bush to get paid.  The “gray rows” are the dates that Bush supposedly trained in Alabama. 

  

TABLE 3:  Training Dates vs Dates Training was Paid For

TRAINING DATE

PAY DATE

Substitute Training?

DAYS UNTIL PAID

03/14/72

04/15/72

YES

31

04/15/72

05/15/72

NO

29

10/28/72

01/04/73

YES

67

11/11/72

01/04/73

YES

53

11/13/72

01/04/73

YES

51

01/04/73

02/15/73

YES

41

01/06/73

02/15/73

YES

39

01/09/73

02/15/73

YES

36

04/07/73

04/30/73

???*

22

05/19/73

06/06/73

NO

17

06/23/73

07/09/73

NO

15

07/21/73

08/07/73

NO

16

07/16/73

08/15/73

YES

29

07/18/73

08/15/73

YES

27

*See Appendix 4

 

It took an average of 23 days for Bush to get paid for training supposedly accomplished with his Texas unit, with the shortest period being 15 days, and the longest 31 days.   The average for payments made for training that Bush allegedly did in Alabama is 48 days, with the shortest period being 36 days and the longest 67 days.

 

It should be noted that “substitute training” itself had minimal impact on the length of time it took for Bush to get paid.   The average time it took to get paid when training was “performed” at TXANG on the UTA dates was 20 days.  (This includes UTAs for April, 1972 and those for April-July, 1973.)  When “substitute training” was performed at TXANG for missed UTAs, the average time it took to get paid was 29 days. (These include  “substitute training” performed for UTAs in March, 1972 and July, 1973.

 

If the Alabama training had been approved in advance, the same form (a AF Form 40a) would have been used to certify the performance of that training as was used to perform “substitute training” done at TXANG.  The TXANG personnel officer who had to do the payroll would have been expecting the 40a’s from Alabama, because he would have been involved in the paperwork authorizing the “substitute training” in Alabama.

 

Thus, there does not appear to be any explanation for the delay in pay for the training that was supposedly done in Alabama other than it not being authorized in advance.  And insofar as at half of this duty could not be authorized under Air Force policy, it would appear that any training in Alabama, if actually done at all, was never properly authorized to begin with.

 

 

PAY AND POINT FRAUD, AND THE WHITE HOUSE CRITERIA FOR “SATISFACTORY PARTICIPATION”

 

The White House claim that Bush “fulfilled his duty” as a member of the United States Armed Forces is based on a memo written by a former TXANG officer by the name of Albert Lloyd.  The Lloyd memo establishes the (erroneous[5]) criteria that Bush required 50 point credits each “retention/retirement year” (R/R year) [6] in order for him to have a “satisfactory year.”  According to the Lloyd memo, “George W Bush had satisfactory years for both 72-73 and 73-74 which proves that he completed his military obligation in a satisfactory manner.”

 

TABLE 4:  Total Points Minus Fraudulent Points

Retention/Retirement Year

May 27, ‘72-May 26, ‘73

May 27, ‘73-May 26, ‘74

Maximum Gratuitous Points

15

15*

Active Duty Points

9

19

Total “UTA” points

32

16

Total Points for R/R year

56

50

Minus “Time Limit” Fraud points

(12)**

(8)***

Total “Non-Fraudulent” Points

44

42

Minus other questionable points

(12)****

(10)*

Total “Unquestionable” Points

32

32

*Bush was placed on “inactive status” effective September 15, 1973 and was eligible for only 5 of the full 15 “gratuitous points”

**Includes points awarded for December 1972, and February and March 1973, \which were awarded for “substitute duty” performed more than 15 days in advance of the credited UTAs

***Includes points awarded for August and September 1973, which were awarded for “substitute duty” performed more than 15 days in advance of the credited UTAs

****Includes points for October and November 1972 and January 1973 for which there is no evidence of necessary prior authorization

 

 

But when one deducts the fraudulently received points from Bush’s point totals, Bush failed to “complete his military obligation” in each of his last two years.

 

Members of the Air National Guard were awarded one point for each day of active duty, one point for each period of UTA training (four points per UTA weekend) or “substitute training”, plus 15 “gratuitous” points per year for maintaining “active status” as ANG members.

 

Table 4 shows that in R/R year 72-73, Bush is credited with nine days/points of active duty, and 32 periods of UTA (or substitute) training, plus 15 gratuitous points for a total of 56 points. 

 

But 12 of those points (those credited toward UTAs in December 1972 and February and March 1973) were clearly fraudulent, falling outside the “15 days prior to the scheduled UTA” limit.  Without these fraudulently credited points, Bush would have only received 44 points, six fewer than the 50 needed for a “satisfactory year” under the White House’s own criteria.  And if one deducts the points for “substitute training” for which there is no evidence of proper advance authorization, Bush only received 32 points for the 72-73 R/R year.

 

In R/R 1973-74, Bush was credited with 19 days/points of active duty, and 16 periods of UTA (or substitute) training.  Lloyd also credits Bush with the full 15 “gratuitous points”, bring the total points for that R/R year to 50.

 

However, eight of the points credited toward UTAs (those for August and September, 1973) were illegitimate because they fell outside of the “15 day limit”.  Without those fraudulently awarded points, Bush would have had a total of only 42 points, eight fewer than the 50 he needed under the White House criteria.  Furthermore, because Bush was placed on “inactive status” effective September 15, 1973, he would have received only five of fifteen “gratuitous points” that were awarded for a year of service.  Bush’s real total points for R/R year 73-74 was 32, less than two thirds of the points necessary for a “good year”.

 

Thus, even using the White House’s own criteria, it is obvious that absent the receipt of fraudulent pay and points, Bush did not “fulfill his duty”, and did not “[complete] his military obligation in a satisfactory manner.”

 

 

THE NON-EXISTENT PAPER TRAIL

 

The payroll and point summaries that the White House uses to assert that Bush “fulfilled his duty” were all generated based on data entered into the payroll system using punch cards.  Air Force procedures mandated that the data entered with these cards be based on signed documents confirming that the training had been both properly authorized in advance, and that it had been performed.

 

Yet, among the hundreds of pages of documents released by the White House in February, not one single piece of paper exists that confirms that Bush was authorized to train, or accomplished any training whatsoever after April 1972. 

 

But a considerable amount of paperwork for all of this training should exist.  Chief among these documents are the AF Form 40a’s which were used to certify that “substitute training” for missed UTAs had been properly authorized in advance, and to certify that the training had been accomplished.

 

All told, Bush performed “substitute training” on at least 20 days.  Thus there should be, at the very least, 20 AF Form 40a’s with the name of the officer who authorized the training in advance, the name and signature the officer who supervised the training, and Bush’s own signature.

 

(There would probably not be any paperwork showing when Bush trained with his unit at Ellington AFB during scheduled UTAs.  An AF Form 40, accompanied by a roster of authorized participants, was used to certify UTA performance itself.  These forms would be kept as part of the unit records.)

 

Bush also supposedly performed 28 days of “active duty training” during the time in question.  There should be written orders authorizing all of this duty in Bush’s files, as well as 10 DD Form 220s certifying the periods spent on active duty training.  No such documents were released by the White House in February.

 

Excerpt from Record Transmittal Form dated 11/15/73

 


 

 


It should also be noted that copies of all of this paperwork should be in both the Texas Air National Guard archives, as well as in the Air Force Reserves archives.  When Bush quit the Texas Air National Guard, a complete set of the documents contained in his “Unit Personnel Record Group” were supposed to be sent to the Air Reserve Personnel Center in Denver, Colorado.  (Whenever someone was assigned to ARPC as Bush was, a complete review of his records was done automatically.)  The Bush files contain a “transmittal form” (see above) certifying that copies of all his records had been sent to Denver.

 

Ironically, despite the absence of documents certifying that Bush was authorized to perform the substitute duty for which he was credited during his last year as a member of TXANG, there is a considerable paper trail authorizing substitute training which Bush never performed.  (See Appendix 3:  The Paper Trail for Non-Existent Training)  

 

This suggests that, had the required documentation existed, it would still be part of Bush’s files, and would have been included in the “complete release” of Bush’s records by the White House.  The fact that it was not released is cause to believe that it never existed at all.

 

 

THE QUESTION OF UNAUTHORIZED TRAINING

 

Without prior authorization, any “training” done by Bush was ineligible for pay and “point credit” toward the performance of the mandatory Unit Training Assemblies.  Yet the evidence is overwhelming that most of the “substitute training” that Bush was paid for was not authorized in advance.   This is especially true with regard to pay for “training” in Alabama.

 

There is little question that Bush’s payroll documents are a record of fraud.  Under Air Force regulations, Bush was eligible to receive pay and credit for required monthly training only if he performed that training with his unit, or performed substitute training no more than 15 days in advance of (or 30 days after) the scheduled unit training itself.

 

Nor was this fraud insignificant.  Although one instance of fraud occurred only 4 days outside the 15 day limit, two instances occurred 18-20 days outside the limit, and two further instances occurred 45 days or more beyond the 15 day limit.  Performing substitute training two months before the scheduled training was more than just a technical violation, it was a clear violation of the intent and purpose of the required training itself. (“Unit training” was required each month in order to ensure that each component of the Air Reserve Forces could be seamlessly integrated into the “active duty” Air Force at a moment’s notice.  See Appendix 1.)   For this reason, it is highly unlikely that this training would have been authorized in advance as required by Air Force policy. 

 

These violations are aggravated by the fact that, in most instances, there is no known reason why Bush could not have performed the training with his unit on the day it was scheduled, or at least performed substitute training within the time limits established by the regulations. 

 

The “Substitute Training” for March UTAs

 

The substitute duty credited as having been performed on January 9 and 10, 1973 is especially egregious and inexplicable, because it was credited toward required training on March 10 and 11, 1973.   It is possible that Bush did know, months in advance, that he would not be available to train with his unit that weekend.  It is not, however, believable that Bush would not be able to train at any time between February 23, 1973 and April 6, 1973.[7] 

 

Nor does it make any sense that substitute training in January for March UTAs would be authorized to be performed in Alabama.  Although it is clear from the Bush files that at least some TXANG officials were willing to ignore the laws of the United States of America and the regulations of the United States Air Force when it came to George W. Bush, there is nothing that suggests that this attitude was shared by officials of the Alabama Air National Guard.

 

When the Alabama officials approved Bush’s request to train with the 187th Tactical Reconnaissance Group, it did so in a way that ensured that Bush’s training would have some value.  Alabama authorized Bush to train only with the 187th during that unit’s scheduled Unit Training Assemblies.  Bush’s request to perform substitute training for his September UTAs was turned down, because the request came after the 187th had done its September UTA training.  (See Appendix 3).

 

Alabama did things “by the book”, and it is difficult to believe that Alabama officials would authorize Bush to train for March UTAs two months in advance.  It is also unlikely that Alabama would authorize substitute training for UTAs to be done on a Tuesday and Wednesday, rather than on a weekend when UTA training was scheduled for the 187th, because Alabama would have had to assign someone to supervise Bush’s training. 

 

Alabama officials were obviously willing to provide training for Bush during scheduled UTAs, and may, under extraordinary circumstances, have been willing to provide substitute training on a weekday.  But Bush’s training was the responsibility of TXANG, and it is absurd to suggest that Alabama officials would authorize substitute training on a weekday for a member of TXANG two months in advance of that member’s scheduled UTA. 

 

The only conclusion that can be reached is that Bush was never properly authorized to perform substitute training in Alabama in January for credit toward March UTAs. 

 

 

The “Substitute Training” for January and February UTAs

 

According to the payroll records, Bush was paid for substitute training that was credited toward January and February UTAs on the same paycheck as the substitute training for his March UTAs.  

 

As noted above, Alabama only authorized substitute training for Bush when it could be done in conjunction with the mandatory monthly weekend training scheduled for the 187th.  According to the payroll records, however, Bush is credited with training on a Thursday and Friday (January 4 and 5, 1973) that was credited toward the training Bush was required to do with TXANG on January 13 and 14.  And, according to those records, Bush is credited with training on Saturday January 6 and Monday January 8, which was credited toward the training Bush was required to do with TXANG on February 10 and 11. 

 

It is not known whether the 187th’s UTA for January were scheduled for Saturday, January 6 and Sunday January 7.  It is known, however, that Bush did not train with the 187th on that Sunday, and that Bush was at the dentist on that Saturday. 

 

The documentary evidence (see Appendix 3) and the statements of Alabama officials (see below) show that it is unlikely that Alabama would authorize Bush to train with the 187th on January 6 unless that unit’s UTAs were held on that weekend.  But it is equally unlikely that Alabama would authorize Bush to do substitute training more than a month in advance of the scheduled UTA so that Bush could keep a dentist appointment.  And it is also highly unlikely that, if the 187th’s UTAs were being held on January 6 and 7, that Alabama would authorize Bush to train on January 8 rather than January 7. 

 

Thus, one can reasonably conclude that the “substitute training” for the February UTAs was never properly authorized.

 

The “substitute training” credited toward January UTAs was done on a weekday, and was paid on the same check as other substitute training that was extremely unlikely to have been authorized in advance by Alabama officials.  Nor is there any evidence that suggests that Bush could not perform his “substitute training” with his TXANG unit.  Given this evidence, there is no reason to suspect that the “substitute training” credited toward January UTAs was properly authorized in advance.

 

 

The Statements of Alabama Officials

 

As noted above, if “substitute training” was properly authorized in advance, it would take less than a week for the forms necessary to process a paycheck to reach TXANG,  and no more than a month to process the forms and have a check issued. That is five weeks maximum.  Yet it took over nine weeks for Bush to get paid for the training that Bush supposedly did in October, and seven weeks to get paid for that credited as having been performed in November. 

 

The final evidence that no prior authorization was give for this training are the statements of Alabama officials themselves. 

 

When Bush received authorization to attend UTAs with the 187th Tac Recon Group in Alabama, he was directed to report to “Lt Col William Turnipseed”, the commander of the 187th.

 

In 2000, Turnipseed said he had no recollection of Bush.  According to the Boston Globe, ''

 

Had he reported in, I would have had some recall, and I do not,'' Turnipseed said. ''I had been in Texas, done my flight training there. If we had had a first lieutenant from Texas, I would have remembered.''[8]

 

As the commander of the 187th, Turnipseed was the person most likely to have been on base on the weekdays on which Bush supposedly trained.   If the training had been properly authorized in advance, he is the person to whom Bush would have been instructed to report.  And, as the unit commander, Turnipseed would have been involved in any approval for Bush to perform training with his unit, and would doubtless have been notified that Bush had shown up for the authorized training if he had done so. 

 

As a supporter of George W. Bush, Turnipseed is clearly unhappy with the way his statements in 2000 have been characterized.  However, in attempting to “debunk” the idea that his not seeing Bush was the equivalent of accusing Bush of being AWOL, Turnipseed provides additional evidence that Bush was never authorized to perform the training for which he was paid.

 

Recently, Turnipseed has suggested that he might not have seen Bush because he may have not been on base on those days which Bush supposedly trained[9].  This is unlikely, but not impossible.  Nor, however, is it germane.  Turnipseed’s 2000 statement is not restricted to meeting Bush.  Turnipseed’s statement is that he had no recall of Bush whatsoever, and that if the unit (“we”) “had a first lieutenant from Texas” that he would have remembered it. 

 

Turnipseed has also made it clear that the authorization to do substitute training was for specific days only, and that Bush had not been given carte blanche to train with the 187th.  (“Bush was never ordered to report for duty to his unit…He (or his assistant, Lott) simply gave Bush the dates he could report if he wanted to do equivalency [sic] training with them.”)  In other words, Bush could not just “show up” at Dannelly Air Force Base at any point and “train” as a member of the 187th, because he was never under the general authority of the 187th.

 

Even more damning, in terms of a lack of authorization, is the statement of the 187th’s Personnel Chief, Kenneth Lott, who also does not recall Bush.  As the personnel officer for the 187th, it would have been Lott’s responsibility to process all requests for authorization for substitute training, as well as to ensure that the proper paperwork authorizing and certifying the training was completed.  Yet, according to the Boston Globe, Lott has “no memory of Bush ever reporting.”[10] 

 From The Atlanta Journal Constitution, 02/13/04

"The truth is George Bush came to Alabama.  He asked for weekend drills with us. He was assigned to me," said Calhoun, who was in Florida on Friday for this weekend's Daytona 500 festivities.
Calhoun said he saw Bush sign in at the 187th Tactical Reconnaissance Group in Montgomery eight to 10 times for roughly eight hours at a time from May to October 1972.

Finally, it should be noted that the story told by only person who claims to have seen Bush training in Alabama, John Calhoun, is completely inconsistent with the information found in the payroll records.  Calhoun claims that Bush showed up on weekends “eight to ten times…from May to October 1972.”[11]  The payroll records show that Bush was never credited with any duty from May until the very end of October of that year, that Bush is not credited with training on a weekend in October, and that he was credited with “training” for only one weekend day during the time he supposedly trained in Alabama.

 

 

 

 

 

Thus, although it is impossible to prove that Bush never showed up at Dannelly Air Force Base to “train”, given the evidence it is equally impossible to believe that Bush received the necessary prior approvals that would have made him eligible to be paid for any such training.

 

 

CONCLUSIONS

 

The evidence that Bush never received the authorization necessary for him to receive pay for training is overwhelming.  

 

1)     The “training” for which he was credited could not have been authorized in advance under Air Force policy.

2)     If the training had been authorized in advance, Bush would have been paid for the training that was accomplished within five weeks of performing the training.  This did not happen for the substitute training that Bush supposedly did in Alabama.

3)     Bush trained on weekdays in Alabama, yet the record shows that Alabama went “by the book” when it came to such substitute training, and only authorized Bush to perform “substitute training” for UTAs when the 187th was scheduled for its own UTAs.

4)     Except for the training which was authorized but for which Bush never appeared, there is not a single piece of paper that suggests that Bush was authorized to train in Alabama, or that he had completed the training for which he was paid.

5)     The commander of the unit where Bush would have trained, who would have had to authorize each day of training, has no recollection of Bush having trained with his unit.

6)     The personnel officer who would have had to process the approval of the training, and would have been responsible for the completing and sending out the forms necessary for Bush to be paid for training, has no recollection of Bush having trained with his unit.

 

Without that authorization, Bush could not be paid.  Bush had to have known that advance authorization was required for him to perform any training.  

 

Yet Bush was paid for “training”.   That is fraud.

 

It should be noted that the dollar amounts concerned here are minimal, and no more than a few hundred dollars.  And although it’s clear that fraud was involved in these payments to Bush, the real significance is not the money he was paid, but the “point credit” that he received.

 

Without prior authorization, Bush could not receive “point credit” for any training that he supposedly performed, and it is on the basis of these “points” that the White House’s claims that Bush “fulfilled his duty” rests.   And although the criteria used by the White House to determine what was required of Bush is erroneous[12], given that up to two thirds of the points that Bush received for “Inactive Duty” in his last 12 months were fraudulently credited, there is little question that Bush failed to “fulfill his duty” even under the standards set by Bush’s own supporters.

 

Ultimately, however, the real issue here is character.  George W. Bush had a six year obligation to the United States Armed Forces to maintain his readiness to serve on active duty at a moment’s notice, should national security require it.  The record shows that for the first four of those six years, Bush fulfilled that commitment.  The record also shows that for the last two years, Bush ignored his obligations. 

 

Each time more truth emerges about those last two years, Bush’s story changes.  Bush never acknowledged that he lost his flight status until records were released in 2000 proving it had happened.  At that point, Bush’s story changed to one where he chose to stop flying, as if it was within his authority (rather than that of the Air Force) to make that decision.  Bush never acknowledged not showing up for any training for more than six months, and when that was revealed, Bush’s story changed to a claim that he had “made up” the time.

 

It is this refusal to acknowledge error and failure, and the creation of new narratives when the facts are completely inconsistent with his original story, that is most disturbing about George W. Bush.  Just as he created a myth with regard to his military career, Bush created a myth to justify the invasion of Iraq.  And just as Bush’s explanation of his military career changed as contrary facts were disclosed, so have Bush’s justifications for the Iraq invasion changed as information contrary to his justifications is exposed.

 

America cannot afford four more years of someone who is so incapable of facing the truth about his own failures, and that of his administration. 

 

 

 

APPENDIX 1:  THE PURPOSE OF “UNIT TRAINING”, AND “SUBSTITUTE TRAINING”

 

To understand the rules concerning substitute training, one must first understand the purpose of the Air National Guard itself, and the purpose of the scheduled monthly training known as UTAs. 

 

From 10 USC 262

 

The United States Statutes describes the purpose of the Guard, which is to provide “trained units and qualified persons available for active duty…[whenever] the national security requires.” 

 

From 10 USC 672

 

The statutes also state that whenever a mobilization occurs, Reservists should be ordered to active duty as part of “units organized and trained to serve as units.” 

 

Units needed to be able to function as units.  It was expected that Bush’s unit, the 111th Fighter Interceptor Squadron of the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group, would be able to function no differently than an active duty Air Force Fighter Interceptor Squadron in the event of a national emergency.
 

 

From 32 USC 502

 

In order to achieve this, the statutes required that National Guard units “assemble for drill and instruction…at least 48 times each year; and participate in training at encampments…at least 15 days each year.” 

 

Within the Air Reserve Forces, these 48 periods of “drill and instruction” were called Unit Training Assemblies (UTAs).  Each UTA had to be at least four hours long, and UTA weekends were scheduled once a month. (Two UTAs were held on both Saturday and Sunday).

 

From 32 USC 501

 

The statutes also required that “the discipline, including training, of the Air National Guard shall conform to that of the Air Force.”  This insured that, should an Air National Guard unit be mobilized, that unit would be able to seamlessly fit into the “active duty component” of the Air Force.

 

Guardsmen that had a Military Service Obligation (MSO) were required to attend at least 90% of the UTAs.  Under certain circumstances, “substitute training” could be performed, but it was expected that such training would fulfill the same purpose as attendance at the scheduled monthly UTAs.

 

 

 

APPENDIX 2:  UNDERSTANDING THE PAYROLL DATA

 

(Note:  For a complete explanation of other aspects of the Payroll Reports, see Understanding Points and Payroll Record  PART I  PAYROLL RECORDS. )

 

Understanding the Transaction Data Lines

 

 At the bottom of most of the payroll records that were released is a section that contains lines of nearly incomprehensible data, that upon examination, turns out to be the data that was entered via punch cards into the payroll system itself.   And it is within these lines of data that the fraudulent nature of Bush’s service is revealed.

 

Transaction Data Lines from Bush’s First Quarter 1973 Payroll Report…”

 


 


There are a number of different line formats within this section of the payroll reports, one of which corresponds to UTAs or  “substitute training” performed.

 

“Top line” of Transaction Data from Bush’s First Quarter 1973 Payroll Report

 

   731011310104N2011320104N1011410105N2011420105NN

Each one of these lines of data starts with the year (“73”) and ends with an “N” (which appears to designate “Inactive Duty”).  Each line represents the one scheduled UTA weekend

 

Between the “73” and the final “N” are found four distinct 11 character groupings of data, each of which corresponds to a one of the four scheduled UTAs in a specific month.  Table A1 shows how this data is broken down in this fashion

 

TABLE A1:  Breakdown of UTA Transaction Data Lines

73

1011310104N

2011320104N

1011410105N

2011420105N

N

Year

First UTA

Second UTA

Third UTA

Fourth UTA

Duty type

 

 

 

 

 

 

Each of these four UTA sections can be further broken down, into two main sections, corresponding to the date and time of the scheduled UTA, and the date and time when the UTA training or “substitute training” was done.  (At the end of each section is a letter “N”, which (presumably) indicates that this training was not eligible for the flight status pay differential available to ANG members who were on flight status.)

 

TABLE A2:  Breakdown of “First UTA” section from Table A1

SCHEDULED UTA DATA

TRAINING PERFORMED DATA

Flight pay designator

PERIOD

MONTH

DAY

PERIOD

MONTH

DAY

1

01

13

1

01

04

N

AM drill

January

13th

AM drill

January

4th

No flight pay

 

 


 


Table A2 shows how the data is broken down into these sections, and how the data in those sections can be further broken down to correspond to the time of the drill (“1”=morning training, “2”=afternoon training), the month of the scheduled/performed training, and the day of the scheduled/performed training. 

 

The data in Table A2 can be translated as “George Bush was scheduled to show up in Texas on the morning of January 13, to train with his unit, but instead performed  “substitute training” on the morning of January 4.”

 

 

Understanding the”Transaction Information” Section

 

The payroll records also contain “Transaction Information” section, which provided details regarding each payment that was made to Bush.  This information includes not just how much Bush was paid and what was deducted from his earnings, but the days and periods of training for which Bush was being paid, and the date that Bush was paid.

 

Transaction Information from Bush’s First Quarter 1973 Payroll Report…”

 


 


Detail 1 from Transaction Information Section (October Training)

 

   1  721028  2  721028   1  721029  2  721029

The bottom two rows of the “transaction information” excerpted from Bush’s First Quarter 1973 payroll report contain the dates (and periods, with “1”=morning training and “2”=afternoon training) for which Bush was paid for training on a single check.  Detail 1 shows that Bush was paid for four periods of “substitute training” in October 1972, with two periods of training on Oct. 28, and two on Oct. 29.

Detail 2 From Transaction In-formation Section (Check date)

 

.  730104

The second row at the far right is the date on which the transaction was completed, and presumably a check was cut  Detail 2 shows that a check was cut on  “730104” (January 4, 1973)

 

By combining  the information from Detail 1 and Detail 2, we can determine how long it took for Bush to get paid for any training that he is credited with performing.

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX 3:  THE PAPER TRAIL FOR NON-EXISTENT TRAINING

 

There is one set of documents authorizing Bush to perform  “substitute training” in Alabama, but ironically, Bush never performed the  “substitute training” that was he was authorized to perform.  But even this set of authorizing documents is incomplete. 

 

These documents consist of

 

·         a request from Bush to perform “equivalent duty” with the 187th Tactical Reconnaissance Group, dated September 5, 1972.  Bush requests authorization to perform “substitute training” for UTAs he planned on missing in September, October, and November.

 

·        a page with two indorsements [13], dated Sept. 6 and Sept. 8.  The first is from Lt. Col. Jerry Killian, Bush’s Squadron Commander, and second is from Col. Bobby Hodges, Commander of the TXANG’s 147rh Fighter Interceptor Group

 

·        an (unsigned) third indorsement dated Sept 11, this one from Major Charles Shoemaker, Chief of Personnel for TXANG, acting on behalf of the head of the Texas Air National Guard

 

·        a page with a fifth indorsement from Kenneth Lott, Chief of ALANG Personnel Branch dated Sept. 15, 1972, as well as a sixth indorsement (dated Sept. 19)  from 2nd Lieutenant David McCutcheon, the Air Admin. and Training Officer for the Alabama Air National Guard.  A seventh indorsement (dated Sept. 21), again from Charles Shoemake, is on this page as well, and indicates that the authorization to train was forwarded to the 147th FIG for action.

 

Once the 147th had received all of this paperwork, it would have contacted the 187th to authorize it to create the necessary AF Form 40a’s that would be used to certify that Bush had performed his training.  (The Form 40a’s were probably the reason why members of the Alabama Air National Guard remember looking for Bush, because he had been expected.)

 

There is no “fourth indorsement”, but based upon the routing of the third indorsement, that document would have come from the office of the Alabama Adjutant General’s office.

 

 Lott’s indorsement authorized Bush to train with the 187th Tac. Recon. Group on the days on which the 187th would be doing their own UTAs (Oct. 7-8, and Nov. 4-5), and tells Bush when and to whom he should report.  However, Bush is not authorized for “substitute training” for the missed UTAs in September, because the September UTAs for the 187th have already been held. 

 

Why paperwork related to “substitute training” that was not performed was maintained in Bush’s files, when there is no documentation of the “substitute training” for which Bush was paid among the papers that were released by the White House, remains unexplained. 

 

Even more mysterious is the fact that all of the documents in Bush’s personnel file that are related to the time he spent in Alabama are concerned with thing that did not happen.  In additional to the authorization for “substitute training” that Bush did not attend, the only other documents concerning the “Alabama year” are the ones related to the request for a transfer to the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron that was turned down by the Air Force. 

 

 

APPENDIX 4:  THE APRIL MYSTERY

 

When the data from the payroll records is compared with other documents found in the Bush files, it is apparent that TXANG officials were covering up for Bush.

 

Bush’s superior officers claimed that Bush “has not been observed” training during the 12 month period ending 4/30/73.  Bush, however is credited with attendance at training periods on the same dates as TXANG held their UTAs.  Had Bush shown up at TXANG for that training, it would have been virtually impossible for his two immediate superior officers not to have “observed” him.  So either Bush received advance authorization to train elsewhere and did so, or Bush’s officers were lying, or Bush was credited and paid for training that he did not accomplish.

 

It only took 22 days for the payment to Bush for training that he supposedly performed in April 1973.  This is 14 days less than the shortest period it took for Bush to get paid for the training he supposedly did in Alabama, which suggests that Bush did the training with his TXANG unit. 

 

Detail 3 From 2nd Quarter 1973 Payroll Report

 

.731040710407N

The payroll data shows that the training itself was done on the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group’s UTA weekend.  The UTAs were scheduled for the weekend of April 7, and according to the records, Bush was credited with training on the weekend of April 7. (see Detail 3 and Table A3)

 

 

TABLE A3:  Breakdown of “First UTA Period” from April 73 UTA Weekend (see Detail 3 above)

 

YEAR

SCHEDULED UTA DATA

TRAINING PERFORMED DATA

Flight pay designator

PERIOD

MONTH

DAY

PERIOD

MONTH

DAY

73

1

04

07

1

04

07

N

1973

AM drill

April

7th

AM drill

April

7th

No flight pay

 

 


 


If Bush did his UTA training at Ellington Air Force Base with his unit, there is simply no way that his superior officers could not have seen him.  Bush would have been required to report to  those officers on two separate days, and sign in and out on the UTA roster for that weekend on each day. 

 

There is no documentation showing that Bush was approved for substitute duty for April 1973, nor has either Bush or his spokespeople ever suggested that Bush did not train with his TXANG unit that month. 

 

The data from the payroll records thus suggests that either Bush’s TXANG superiors were lying on Bush’s “Training Evaluation”, or Bush was paid and given point credit for attendance at mandatory training when he didn’t show up. 

 

In either case, the “April Mystery” can lead to only one conclusion:  TXANG officials were covering up for Bush, and were willing to falsify records in order to do so.  And although The “April Mystery” does not prove that Bush was paid for training that he never performed, it does show that TXANG officials were perfectly willing to ignore regulations when it came to George W. Bush. 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX 5--ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS FROM THE PAYROLL RECORDS

 

Bush is also credited with training on his units UTA weekends in May, June, and July.  But although a reward was offered to anyone who could prove that Bush returned to Ellington after his “Alabama year”, no one has come forward to claim that money.  In fact, the person who would have to process Bush’s checks (the personnel officer for the 147th FIG) has stated that he thought Bush finished his final year in Alabama[14]. 

 

Notification that Bush Should be Reassigned (dated June 29, 1973)

 

 

By early July, TXANG had been notified by the Air Force that Bush should not have a pilot’s Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) if he was not going to train as a pilot, and told TXANG that Bush “should be reassigned.”  Nevertheless, TXANG supposedly ordered Bush to perform 13 days of active duty training in July.  And TXANG supposedly authorized four days of “substitute training” in July for UTAs scheduled for August and September.

 

Finally, it should be noted that this “substitute training” was supposedly done on July 16-19, 1973, and that July’s UTA training was supposedly done on July 21-22.  However, Bush received payment for July 21-22 on August 7, and was not paid until eight days later (August 15) for training supposedly done days before the July UTAs.

 

The variance in the amount of time it took Bush to get paid for training raises serious questions.  Based on this pay data (as well as the “15 days in advance” policy discussed above) it is difficult to believe that Bush received the necessary advance approvals to perform “substitute training” for the UTAs for which he was credited.  Indeed, given these factors, it is not unlikely that Bush never did any of this “substitute training” at all.



[1] 32 USC 502a

[2] Under current regulations, the “Appropriate Duty” category no longer exists, and “Equivalent Training” is the term used to denote all training done as a substitute for scheduled UTAs that are missed.

[3] Although the time limits mentioned in the regulations are found in a section of the Air Reserve Personnel Manual specific to procedures for the Air Force Reserves, under United States law the “discipline, including training, of the Air National Guard shall conform to that of the Air Force.” (32 USC 501a)  Throughout the policies, regulations, and statutes concerning training, the only significant differences between the USAFR and the ANG were the procedures to be followed, and not the training requirements themselves.  Currently, ANG regulations allow “substitute training” to be done no more than 30 days in advance of, or after, a scheduled UTA, however, requirements for training have been considerably relaxed over the last 30 years.  Thus it is more than reasonable to assume that Bush could only be authorized to perform “substitute training” no more than 15 days in advance of his scheduled UTAs.

[4] The  “substitute training” credited for the February 1973 UTAs was not performed on consecutive days, but on January 6 and 8, 1973.

[5] See BUSH'S ATTENDANCE OBLIGATIONS AS A MEMBER OF THE US MILITARY

[6] The “retention/retirement year” was an annual period that began on the anniversary of an ANG member’s enlistment.  Bush enlisted on May 27, 1968, and his “retirement/retention year” began on May 27 and ended on May 26 in the following year.

[7] April 6 is only 27 days after March 10.  However, although substitute training was permitted up until 30 days after a scheduled UTA, all  substitute training also had to be accomplished prior to the next monthly UTA.  Because the April UTAs were scheduled for the weekend of April 7 and 8, 1973, under the regulations Bush would have had to complete substitute training for March UTAs by April 6.

[8] Walter V. Robinson, 1 Year Gap in Bush’s Guard Duty,  Boston Globe, 5/23/2000

[9] http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1073076/posts?page=1,50 (Turnipseed’s comments are fully consistent with Air Force policies.  However,.this is based on the account of a member of Free Republic.com, a site not known for its credibility.)

[10] Walter V. Robinson, 1 Year Gap in Bush’s Guard Duty,  Boston Globe, 5/23/2000

[11] Hirschman, Dave and Basu, Moni; Memories place Bush in Alabama if records don’t , Atlanta Journal Constitution, 2/13/04

[12] The White House claims that Bush only needed to get 50 points per “retirement year”.  This was simply not the case.  See  BUSH'S ATTENDANCE OBLIGATIONS AS A MEMBER OF THE US MILITARY.

[13] The term “indorsement” is used to connote a formal approval or sanction of paperwork in the military.  Its meaning is equivalent to “endorsement”.

[14] “…Ellington's top personnel officer at the time, retired Colonel Rufus G. Martin, said he had believed that First Lieutenant Bush completed his final year of service in Alabama.”, Walter V. Robinson, 1 Year Gap in Bush’s Guard Duty,  Boston Globe, 5/23/2000