NOTE: THIS IS A WORKING DRAFT FOR COMMENT, AND IS
PART OF THE AWOL PROJECT, A LARGE SERIES OF ARTICLES
EXAMINING BUSH’S MILITARY RECORDS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE FEDERAL STATUTES,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REGULATIONS, AND AIR FORCE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF
THAT ERA.
COMMENTS, CORRECTIONS, AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISIONS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO awol@glcq.com.
On February 10, 2004, the White House released George W Bush’s
quarterly payroll summaries for his last year in the Texas Air National Guard,
claiming that they proved that Bush had “fulfilled his duties” as a member of
the US Armed Forces. However, An examination
of these records within the context of laws and policies of that time reveals
that at least half (and as much as two thirds) of the pay and “points”
credited toward Bush’s mandatory monthly training were fraudulent. When one deducts these fraudulent points
from Bush’s records, Bush does not achieve the minimum number of points
under the White House’s own (erroneous) criteria.
It
is likely that the White House is unaware of what the payroll records
reveal, because the most damning information is buried in lines of
“incomprehensible” data found at the bottom of the payroll reports. This article breaks that code, and shows
that Bush repeatedly claimed credit and pay for performing “substitute
training” for mandatory monthly drills with his unit that was well outside
the time limits set for “substitute training.” And although he was required to get advance
authorization for all training, the public record shows that Bush could not have received the
necessary authorizations for “training” performed in Alabama .
CIRCUMSTANCES
BEYOND BUSH’S CONTROL?
TIME LIMITS
FOR SUBSTITUTE TRAINING
FRAUDULENT
PAY AND CREDIT FOR “SUBSTITUTE TRAINING”
PAY AND POINT FRAUD, AND THE WHITE HOUSE CRITERIA FOR
“SATISFACTORY PARTICIPATION”
THE QUESTION OF UNAUTHORIZED TRAINING
The
“Substitute Training” for March UTAs
The “Substitute
Training” for January and February UTAs
The Statements
of Alabama Officials
APPENDIX 1: THE
PURPOSE OF “UNIT TRAINING”, AND “SUBSTITUTE TRAINING”
APPENDIX 2:
UNDERSTANDING THE PAYROLL DATA
UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSACTION DATA
LINES
UNDERSTANDING THE
"TRANSACTION INFORMATION"
SECTION
APPENDIX 3 THE PAPER TRAIL FOR NON-EXISTENT TRAINING
APPENDIX 5--ADDITIONAL
OBSERVATIONS FROM THE PAYROLL RECORDS
A
great deal of attention has been paid to the payroll records of George W. Bush
of late. Most of that attention has
been based on whether or not Bush was credited with, and paid for, sufficient
training to meet the requirements of the United States Armed Forces. No
attention has been given to whether or not the “points” and pay were
legitimate.
An
examination of the payroll records, within the context of the laws and policies
concerning pay and credit for mandatory monthly training, shows that up to two
thirds of the payments and points Bush received in his last year as a member of
the Texas Air National Guard (TXANG) were fraudulent.
This
article will explain what the policies were, what the payroll records reveal,
and how it was impossible for Bush to legitimately receive the credit and pay
for the “training” he supposed performed.
It will also explore the ways in which these payroll records interface
both with other documents in the Bush files and with public statements made by
individuals who were involved in this controversy, and demonstrate how there is
only one conclusion to be drawn from these records.
George
W. Bush committed fraud in claiming credit and pay for most of the “training”
he supposedly did in his last twelve months as a member of the Air National
Guard.
Under
Federal statutes[1], Department
of Defense regulations, and Air Force policy, all Air National Guard (ANG) units
were required to hold scheduled drills (Unit Training Assemblies or UTAs)
once weekend each month. Each weekend
consisted of four, four-hour UTAs, two on Saturday and two on Sunday. (See Appendix 1:
The Purpose of “Unit Training” and “Substitute Training”)
From CFR Title 32,
Chapter 101 Sec 3(b)
As a pilot with a six year “Military Service Obligation” (MSO) George W. Bush was required by law to attend at least 90% of these training weekends, or perform authorized “substitute training.” Failure to participate in the required training would result in Bush losing his draft deferment, and being required to go on active duty for up to 24 months.
(For
a fully referenced, footnoted, and detailed explanation of Bush’s attendance
obligations as a member of the Air National Guard, see BUSH'S
ATTENDANCE OBLIGATIONS AS A MEMBER OF THE US MILITARY. )
From AFM 35-3, Chapter
2, Para 2-22(b)
The
two types of “substitute training” were
“Equivalent Training” (EQT), which could be authorized only if an
ANG member was on active duty at the time of a scheduled UTA, and
“Appropriate Duty” (APDY), which could be authorized “when absence is from
cause beyond their control, such as illness or other personal hardship”.[2]
AFM 35-3 Table 16-3 “Authorizing
and Performing APDY or EQT…”
From AFM 35-3
Chapter 20, Para. 8
The
payroll records show that, during his last year as a member of TXANG, Bush
missed 2/3 of his mandatory UTAs, and performed substitute duty instead. These records also show that Bush was not on
active duty at any time when mandatory training was scheduled. Thus, Bush must have claimed that
circumstances beyond his control prevented him from attending eight of his last
twelve mandatory training weekends.
Based
on claims made by the White House, “substitute training” was performed in
Alabama for six of the eight weekends Bush failed to attend mandatory weekend
training with his TXANG unit. Because
UTAs were designed to ensure that Air National Guard units could function as
units if called to active duty (see Appendix 1), Bush had to have claimed that “circumstances
beyond his control” prevented him from performing the “substitute training”
with his own unit.
Yet
there is no known reason why Bush was unable to attend UTAs with his TXANG unit
for five months (December 1972, and January, February, March and August,
1973). Nor is there any known reason
why Bush needed to perform “substitute training” in Alabama for four of those
five months. Most significantly, there
is no known reason why Bush needed to perform substitute training in Alabama in
January 1973 for UTAs with his TXANG unit that were scheduled for February and
March.
Without
a good reason for missing his mandatory monthly training, Bush could not
receive prior authorization to perform “substitute training”. Table 1 shows the extent to which there are
serious questions with regard to the need for Bush to perform “substitute
training”.
Table 1: Possible explanations for Performance
of substitute training Date of scheduled UTA Date of training credited
toward UTA Substitute Training? Where White House Claims
“substitute training” Was Done Possible Reason for
Substitute Training 10/14/72 10/28/72 Yes Alabama Working on a Campaign 11/04/72 11/11/72 Yes Alabama Working on a Campaign 12/02/72 11/13/72 Yes Alabama ???? 01/13/73 01/04/73 Yes Alabama ???? 02/10/73 01/06/73 Yes Alabama ???? 03/10/73 01/09/73 Yes Alabama ???? 04/07/73 04/07/73 ???* ???? ???? 05/19/73 05/19/73 NO Not Applicable Not Applicable 06/23/73 06/23/73 NO Not Applicable Not Applicable 07/21/73 07/21/73 NO Not Applicable Not Applicable 08/18/73 07/16/73 Yes Texas ???? 09/22/73 07/18/73 Yes Texas Classes at Harvard *
Although Bush is credited with UTA performance on the date of his
scheduled UTA, Bush's officers claim that he was "not
observed" at Ellington AFB on these dates. See Appendix
4
Except from Bush’s Discharge Form
dated 10-1-73
We
also know that the problem was not a sudden illness or other emergency, because
the “substitute training” for these
five months was performed before the dates for which the UTAs were
scheduled. And although it is possible
that Bush had “things to do” on the scheduled UTA weekends in December, 1972
and January, February and March, 1973, there is no explanation why Bush did not
perform “substitute training” with his own unit for those months, rather than
“train” in Alabama.
In
addition to limitations on the reasons why “substitute training” could be
authorized, there were also restrictions on when “substitute training” could be
performed.
Detail from AFM 35-3 Table 16-3
Despite
this restriction, more than 60% of the training credited as “substitute training”
for UTAs was done more than 15 days before “the regularly scheduled UTA”..
An
examination of the payroll transaction data shows that, of the 48 UTA periods
for which Bush received credit, at least 32 were for “substitute training”, and
at least 20 of these periods of training were performed more than 15 days in
advance of the scheduled UTA, in violation of Air Force Policy. (See Appendix
2: Understanding the Payroll Data
for an explanation of how the payroll data reveals this information.)
Table
2 compares the dates on which the payroll data shows that TXANG UTA weekends
were scheduled for Bush’s unit in TXANG, and the first of two consecutive days[4] on which “substitute training” was
supposedly performed. (Each weekend
consisted of four UTAs.)
TABLE 2: UTA Weekend Scheduled, and Date Training
was “Performed” Date of scheduled UTA weekend First day of training credited
toward UTA Number of days training was
performed in advance 10/14/72 10/28/72 -14* 11/04/72 11/11/72 -7* 12/02/72 11/13/72 19 01/13/73 01/04/73 9 02/10/73 01/06/73 35 03/10/73 01/09/73 60 04/07/73 04/07/73 0 05/19/73 05/19/73 0 06/23/73 06/23/73 0 07/21/73 07/21/73 0 08/18/73 07/16/73 33 09/22/73 07/18/73 66 *Bush
performed "substitute training" for Oct. and Nov. 1972 after
the dates of corresponding scheduled UTAs
The
“gray shaded” rows show the times where “ substitute training” was performed
more than 15 days in advanced of the scheduled UTAs. For December, 1972 UTAs,
“substitute training” was performed 19 days in advance, for February,
1973 UTAs, 35 days in advance, for March, 60 days in advance, for August 33
days in advance, and for September, 66 days in advance. (The negative numbers for October and
November 1972 indicate that “substitute training” was supposedly performed 14
days and 7 days after the scheduled UTAs respectively for those months. )
This
is clear and unequivocal evidence of fraud.
Under Air Force policy, Bush could not receive permission for
“substitute training” done more than 15 days in advance of scheduled UTAs. Yet the payroll records show that he was
paid for performing “substitute
training” supposedly performed more than 15 days in advance for five different
months of UTAs, four of which were supposedly performed 33 days or more in
advance.
This
data, however, does not provide any information regarding how the fraud was
accomplished. There are three possible
“explanations”:
1)
The
hierarchies of both the Texas Air National Guard and the Alabama Air National
Guard ignored Air Force policy, and authorized substitute training that would
be done more than 15 days in advance of the corresponding scheduled training.
2)
Fraudulent/forged
documents were created, attesting to the advance approval and performance of
substitute training in Alabama, and submitted for payment to TXANG.
3)
Bush
was paid for substitute training performed in Alabama without the required
documents showing that the training was approved in advance, and certifying
that the training had been accomplished.
Evidence
from the payroll records, as well as other circumstantial evidence, make it
extremely unlikely that the “substitute training” was properly authorized. It is also unlikely that documents were
forged and submitted, because Air Force policies and procedures would have made
detection of the forgeries easy and inevitable.
Thus,
the likeliest explanation for Bush fraudulently receiving pay and credit for
“substitute training” is that TXANG officials arranged to have Bush credited
with training without the necessary authorizations and paperwork.
In
addition to showing that much of the pay and “point credit” that Bush received
was fraudulent, the payroll records also provide compelling evidence that the
“substitute training” was never authorized in advance, and quite possibly never
accomplished.
The
payroll records show that when Bush trained with his TXANG unit, he was always
paid for training within one month of the training being accomplished.
From AFM 35-3 Chapter
20, Para 12
Yet,
Bush was not paid for the “substitute training” he supposedly performed on
October 28 and 29, 1972 until January 4, 1973. On that same date (and with the same check) Bush was also paid
for duty on November 11-14, 1972. It
took over nine weeks (67 days) for Bush to be paid for the October duty, and
over seven weeks (51 days) for the November duty.
Table
3 lists the dates on which UTA or “substitute training” was supposedly
performed, and the dates on which a check was (presumably) cut, for all
“transactions” that can be deciphered in the payroll records, and the number of
days it took Bush to get paid. The
“gray rows” are the dates that Bush supposedly trained in Alabama.
TABLE 3: Training Dates vs Dates Training was
Paid For TRAINING DATE PAY DATE Substitute Training? DAYS UNTIL PAID 03/14/72 04/15/72 YES 31 04/15/72 05/15/72 NO 29 10/28/72 01/04/73 YES 67 11/11/72 01/04/73 YES 53 11/13/72 01/04/73 YES 51 01/04/73 02/15/73 YES 41 01/06/73 02/15/73 YES 39 01/09/73 02/15/73 YES 36 04/07/73 04/30/73 ???* 22 05/19/73 06/06/73 NO 17 06/23/73 07/09/73 NO 15 07/21/73 08/07/73 NO 16 07/16/73 08/15/73 YES 29 07/18/73 08/15/73 YES 27 *See Appendix
4
It
should be noted that “substitute training” itself had minimal impact on the
length of time it took for Bush to get paid.
The average time it took to get paid when training was “performed” at
TXANG on the UTA dates was 20 days.
(This includes UTAs for April, 1972 and those for April-July,
1973.) When “substitute training” was
performed at TXANG for missed UTAs, the average time it took to get paid was 29
days. (These include “substitute
training” performed for UTAs in March, 1972 and July, 1973.
If
the Alabama training had been approved in advance, the same form (a AF Form
40a) would have been used to certify the performance of that training as was
used to perform “substitute training” done at TXANG. The TXANG personnel officer who had to do the payroll would have
been expecting the 40a’s from Alabama, because he would have been involved in
the paperwork authorizing the “substitute training” in Alabama.
Thus,
there does not appear to be any explanation for the delay in pay for the
training that was supposedly done in Alabama other than it not being authorized
in advance. And insofar as at half of
this duty could not be authorized under Air Force policy, it would appear that any
training in Alabama, if actually done at all, was never properly authorized to
begin with.
The
White House claim that Bush “fulfilled his duty” as a member of the United
States Armed Forces is based on a memo written by a former TXANG officer by the
name of Albert Lloyd. The Lloyd memo establishes
the (erroneous[5]) criteria
that Bush required 50 point credits each “retention/retirement year” (R/R
year) [6]
in order for him to have a “satisfactory year.” According to the Lloyd memo, “George W Bush had satisfactory
years for both 72-73 and 73-74 which proves that he completed his military
obligation in a satisfactory manner.”
TABLE 4: Total Points Minus Fraudulent Points Retention/Retirement
Year May 27, ‘72-May 26, ‘73 May 27, ‘73-May 26, ‘74 Maximum Gratuitous Points 15 15* Active Duty Points 9 19 Total “UTA” points 32 16 Total Points for R/R year 56 50 Minus “Time Limit” Fraud points (12)** (8)*** Total “Non-Fraudulent”
Points 44 42 Minus other questionable points (12)**** (10)* Total “Unquestionable”
Points 32 32 *Bush was placed on “inactive status” effective
September 15, 1973 and was eligible for only 5 of the full 15 “gratuitous
points” **Includes
points awarded for December 1972, and February and March 1973, \which
were awarded for “substitute duty” performed more than 15 days in advance
of the credited UTAs ***Includes
points awarded for August and September 1973, which were awarded for
“substitute duty” performed more than 15 days in advance of the credited
UTAs ****Includes
points for October and November 1972 and January 1973 for which there is
no evidence of necessary prior authorization
Members
of the Air National Guard were awarded one point for each day of active duty,
one point for each period of UTA training (four points per UTA weekend) or
“substitute training”, plus 15 “gratuitous” points per year for maintaining
“active status” as ANG members.
Table
4 shows that in R/R year 72-73, Bush is credited with nine days/points of
active duty, and 32 periods of UTA (or substitute) training, plus 15 gratuitous
points for a total of 56 points.
But
12 of those points (those credited toward UTAs in December 1972 and February
and March 1973) were clearly fraudulent, falling outside the “15 days prior to the
scheduled UTA” limit. Without these
fraudulently credited points, Bush would have only received 44 points, six
fewer than the 50 needed for a “satisfactory year” under the White House’s own
criteria. And if one deducts the points
for “substitute training” for which there is no evidence of proper advance
authorization, Bush only received 32 points for the 72-73 R/R year.
In
R/R 1973-74, Bush was credited with 19 days/points of active duty, and 16
periods of UTA (or substitute) training.
Lloyd also credits Bush with the full 15 “gratuitous points”, bring the
total points for that R/R year to 50.
However,
eight of the points credited toward UTAs (those for August and September, 1973)
were illegitimate because they fell outside of the “15 day limit”. Without those fraudulently awarded points,
Bush would have had a total of only 42 points, eight fewer than the 50 he
needed under the White House criteria.
Furthermore, because Bush was placed on “inactive status” effective
September 15, 1973, he would have received only five of fifteen “gratuitous
points” that were awarded for a year of service. Bush’s real total points for R/R year 73-74 was 32, less than two
thirds of the points necessary for a “good year”.
Thus,
even using the White House’s own criteria, it is obvious that absent the
receipt of fraudulent pay and points, Bush did not “fulfill his duty”, and did
not “[complete] his military obligation in a satisfactory manner.”
The
payroll and point summaries that the White House uses to assert that Bush
“fulfilled his duty” were all generated based on data entered into the payroll
system using punch cards. Air Force
procedures mandated that the data entered with these cards be based on signed
documents confirming that the training had been both properly authorized in
advance, and that it had been performed.
Yet,
among the hundreds of pages of documents released by the White House in
February, not one single piece of paper exists that confirms that Bush was
authorized to train, or accomplished any training whatsoever after April
1972.
But
a considerable amount of paperwork for all of this training should exist. Chief among these documents are the AF
Form 40a’s which were used to certify that “substitute training” for missed
UTAs had been properly authorized in advance, and to certify that the training
had been accomplished.
All
told, Bush performed “substitute training” on at least 20 days. Thus there should be, at the very least, 20
AF Form 40a’s with the name of the officer who authorized the training in
advance, the name and signature the officer who supervised the training, and
Bush’s own signature.
(There
would probably not be any paperwork showing when Bush trained with his unit at
Ellington AFB during scheduled UTAs. An
AF Form 40, accompanied by a roster of authorized participants, was used to
certify UTA performance itself. These
forms would be kept as part of the unit records.)
Bush
also supposedly performed 28 days of “active duty training” during the time in
question. There should be written
orders authorizing all of this duty in Bush’s files, as well as 10 DD Form 220s
certifying the periods spent on active duty training. No such documents were released by the White House in February.
Excerpt from Record Transmittal Form dated 11/15/73
It
should also be noted that copies of all of this paperwork should be in both the
Texas Air National Guard archives, as well as in the Air Force Reserves
archives. When Bush quit the Texas Air
National Guard, a complete set of the documents contained in his “Unit
Personnel Record Group” were supposed to be sent to the Air Reserve Personnel
Center in Denver, Colorado. (Whenever
someone was assigned to ARPC as Bush was, a complete review of his records was
done automatically.) The Bush files
contain a “transmittal form” (see above) certifying that copies of all his
records had been sent to Denver.
Ironically,
despite the absence of documents certifying that Bush was authorized to perform
the substitute duty for which he was credited during his last year as a member
of TXANG, there is a considerable paper trail authorizing substitute training
which Bush never performed. (See Appendix 3:
The Paper Trail for Non-Existent Training)
This
suggests that, had the required documentation existed, it would still be part
of Bush’s files, and would have been included in the “complete release” of
Bush’s records by the White House. The
fact that it was not released is cause to believe that it never existed at all.
Without
prior authorization, any “training” done by Bush was ineligible for pay and
“point credit” toward the performance of the mandatory Unit Training
Assemblies. Yet the evidence is
overwhelming that most of the “substitute training” that Bush was paid for was
not authorized in advance. This is
especially true with regard to pay for “training” in Alabama.
There
is little question that Bush’s payroll documents are a record of fraud. Under Air Force regulations, Bush was
eligible to receive pay and credit for required monthly training only if he
performed that training with his unit, or performed substitute training no more
than 15 days in advance of (or 30 days after) the scheduled unit training
itself.
Nor
was this fraud insignificant. Although
one instance of fraud occurred only 4 days outside the 15 day limit, two
instances occurred 18-20 days outside the limit, and two further instances
occurred 45 days or more beyond the 15 day limit. Performing substitute training two months before the scheduled
training was more than just a technical violation, it was a clear violation of the
intent and purpose of the required training itself. (“Unit training” was
required each month in order to ensure that each component of the Air Reserve
Forces could be seamlessly integrated into the “active duty” Air Force at a
moment’s notice. See Appendix 1.)
For this reason, it is highly unlikely that this training would have
been authorized in advance as required by Air Force policy.
These
violations are aggravated by the fact that, in most instances, there is no
known reason why Bush could not have performed the training with his unit on
the day it was scheduled, or at least performed substitute training within the
time limits established by the regulations.
The
substitute duty credited as having been performed on January 9 and 10, 1973 is
especially egregious and inexplicable, because it was credited toward required
training on March 10 and 11, 1973. It
is possible that Bush did know, months in advance, that he would not be
available to train with his unit that weekend.
It is not, however, believable that Bush would not be able to train at
any time between February 23, 1973 and April 6, 1973.[7]
Nor
does it make any sense that substitute training in January for March UTAs would
be authorized to be performed in Alabama.
Although it is clear from the Bush files that at least some TXANG
officials were willing to ignore the laws of the United States of America and
the regulations of the United States Air Force when it came to George W. Bush,
there is nothing that suggests that this attitude was shared by officials of
the Alabama Air National Guard.
When
the Alabama officials approved Bush’s request to train with the 187th Tactical
Reconnaissance Group, it did so in a way that ensured that Bush’s training
would have some value. Alabama
authorized Bush to train only with the 187th during that unit’s scheduled Unit
Training Assemblies. Bush’s request to
perform substitute training for his September UTAs was turned down, because the
request came after the 187th had done its September UTA training. (See Appendix 3).
Alabama
did things “by the book”, and it is difficult to believe that Alabama officials
would authorize Bush to train for March UTAs two months in advance. It is also unlikely that Alabama would
authorize substitute training for UTAs to be done on a Tuesday and Wednesday,
rather than on a weekend when UTA training was scheduled for the 187th,
because Alabama would have had to assign someone to supervise Bush’s
training.
Alabama
officials were obviously willing to provide training for Bush during scheduled
UTAs, and may, under extraordinary circumstances, have been willing to provide
substitute training on a weekday. But
Bush’s training was the responsibility of TXANG, and it is absurd to suggest
that Alabama officials would authorize substitute training on a weekday for a
member of TXANG two months in advance of that member’s scheduled UTA.
The
only conclusion that can be reached is that Bush was never properly authorized
to perform substitute training in Alabama in January for credit toward March
UTAs.
The “Substitute Training” for
January and February UTAs
According
to the payroll records, Bush was paid for substitute training that was credited
toward January and February UTAs on the same paycheck as the substitute
training for his March UTAs.
As
noted above, Alabama only authorized substitute training for Bush when it could
be done in conjunction with the mandatory monthly weekend training scheduled
for the 187th. According to the payroll
records, however, Bush is credited with training on a Thursday and Friday
(January 4 and 5, 1973) that was credited toward the training Bush was required
to do with TXANG on January 13 and 14.
And, according to those records, Bush is credited with training on
Saturday January 6 and Monday January 8, which was credited toward the training
Bush was required to do with TXANG on February 10 and 11.
It
is not known whether the 187th’s UTA for January were scheduled for Saturday,
January 6 and Sunday January 7. It is
known, however, that Bush did not train with the 187th on that Sunday, and that
Bush was at the dentist on that Saturday.
The
documentary evidence (see Appendix 3) and
the statements of Alabama officials (see below) show that it is unlikely that
Alabama would authorize Bush to train with the 187th on January 6 unless that
unit’s UTAs were held on that weekend.
But it is equally unlikely that Alabama would authorize Bush to do
substitute training more than a month in advance of the scheduled UTA so that
Bush could keep a dentist appointment.
And it is also highly unlikely that, if the 187th’s UTAs were being held
on January 6 and 7, that Alabama would authorize Bush to train on January 8
rather than January 7.
Thus,
one can reasonably conclude that the “substitute training” for the February
UTAs was never properly authorized.
The
“substitute training” credited toward January UTAs was done on a weekday, and
was paid on the same check as other substitute training that was extremely
unlikely to have been authorized in advance by Alabama officials. Nor is there any evidence that suggests that
Bush could not perform his “substitute training” with his TXANG unit. Given this evidence, there is no reason to
suspect that the “substitute training” credited toward January UTAs was
properly authorized in advance.
The Statements of Alabama Officials
As
noted above, if “substitute training” was properly authorized in advance, it
would take less than a week for the forms necessary to process a paycheck to
reach TXANG, and no more than a month
to process the forms and have a check issued. That is five weeks maximum. Yet it took over nine weeks for Bush to get
paid for the training that Bush supposedly did in October, and seven weeks to
get paid for that credited as having been performed in November.
The
final evidence that no prior authorization was give for this training are the
statements of Alabama officials themselves.
When
Bush received authorization to attend UTAs with the 187th Tac Recon Group in
Alabama, he was directed to report to “Lt Col William Turnipseed”, the
commander of the 187th.
In
2000, Turnipseed said he had no recollection of Bush. According to the Boston Globe, ''
Had he reported in, I would have had some recall, and I do not,'' Turnipseed said. ''I had been in Texas, done my flight training there. If we had had a first lieutenant from Texas, I would have remembered.''[8]
As
the commander of the 187th, Turnipseed was the person most likely to have been
on base on the weekdays on which Bush supposedly trained. If the training had been properly authorized
in advance, he is the person to whom Bush would have been instructed to
report. And, as the unit commander,
Turnipseed would have been involved in any approval for Bush to perform
training with his unit, and would doubtless have been notified that Bush had
shown up for the authorized training if he had done so.
From Debunking The Bush AWOL Story - From
The Horse's Mouth (2/6/2004)
Recently,
Turnipseed has suggested that he might not have seen Bush because he may have
not been on base on those days which Bush supposedly trained[9]. This is unlikely, but not impossible. Nor, however, is it germane. Turnipseed’s 2000 statement is not
restricted to meeting Bush.
Turnipseed’s statement is that he had no recall of Bush whatsoever, and
that if the unit (“we”) “had a first lieutenant from Texas” that he would have
remembered it.
Turnipseed
has also made it clear that the authorization to do substitute training was for
specific days only, and that Bush had not been given carte blanche to train
with the 187th. (“Bush was never
ordered to report for duty to his unit…He (or his assistant, Lott) simply gave
Bush the dates he could report if he wanted to do equivalency [sic] training
with them.”) In other words, Bush could
not just “show up” at Dannelly Air Force Base at any point and “train” as a
member of the 187th, because he was never under the general authority of the
187th.
Even
more damning, in terms of a lack of authorization, is the statement of the
187th’s Personnel Chief, Kenneth Lott, who also does not recall Bush. As the personnel officer for the 187th, it would
have been Lott’s responsibility to process all requests for authorization for
substitute training, as well as to ensure that the proper paperwork authorizing
and certifying the training was completed.
Yet, according to the Boston Globe, Lott has “no memory of Bush ever
reporting.”[10]
From The
Atlanta Journal Constitution, 02/13/04 "The
truth is George Bush came to Alabama.
He asked for weekend drills with us. He was assigned to me,"
said Calhoun, who was in Florida on Friday for this weekend's Daytona 500
festivities.
Calhoun said he saw Bush sign in at the 187th Tactical
Reconnaissance Group in Montgomery eight to 10 times for roughly eight
hours at a time from May to October 1972.
Thus,
although it is impossible to prove that Bush never showed up at Dannelly Air
Force Base to “train”, given the evidence it is equally impossible to believe
that Bush received the necessary prior approvals that would have made him
eligible to be paid for any such training.
The
evidence that Bush never received the authorization necessary for him to
receive pay for training is overwhelming.
1)
The
“training” for which he was credited could not have been authorized in advance
under Air Force policy.
2)
If the
training had been authorized in advance, Bush would have been paid for the
training that was accomplished within five weeks of performing the
training. This did not happen for the
substitute training that Bush supposedly did in Alabama.
3)
Bush trained
on weekdays in Alabama, yet the record shows that Alabama went “by the book”
when it came to such substitute training, and only authorized Bush to perform
“substitute training” for UTAs when the 187th was scheduled for its own UTAs.
4)
Except
for the training which was authorized but for which Bush never appeared, there
is not a single piece of paper that suggests that Bush was authorized to train
in Alabama, or that he had completed the training for which he was paid.
5)
The
commander of the unit where Bush would have trained, who would have had to
authorize each day of training, has no recollection of Bush having trained with
his unit.
6)
The
personnel officer who would have had to process the approval of the training,
and would have been responsible for the completing and sending out the forms
necessary for Bush to be paid for training, has no recollection of Bush having
trained with his unit.
Without
that authorization, Bush could not be paid.
Bush had to have known that advance authorization was required for him
to perform any training.
Yet
Bush was paid for “training”. That is
fraud.
It
should be noted that the dollar amounts concerned here are minimal, and no more
than a few hundred dollars. And
although it’s clear that fraud was involved in these payments to Bush, the real
significance is not the money he was paid, but the “point credit” that he
received.
Without
prior authorization, Bush could not receive “point credit” for any training
that he supposedly performed, and it is on the basis of these “points” that the
White House’s claims that Bush “fulfilled his duty” rests. And although the criteria used by the White
House to determine what was required of Bush is erroneous[12],
given that up to two thirds of the points that Bush received for “Inactive
Duty” in his last 12 months were fraudulently credited, there is little
question that Bush failed to “fulfill his duty” even under the standards set by
Bush’s own supporters.
Ultimately,
however, the real issue here is character.
George W. Bush had a six year obligation to the United States Armed
Forces to maintain his readiness to serve on active duty at a moment’s notice,
should national security require it.
The record shows that for the first four of those six years, Bush fulfilled
that commitment. The record also shows
that for the last two years, Bush ignored his obligations.
Each
time more truth emerges about those last two years, Bush’s story changes. Bush never acknowledged that he lost his
flight status until records were released in 2000 proving it had happened. At that point, Bush’s story changed to one
where he chose to stop flying, as if it was within his authority (rather than
that of the Air Force) to make that decision.
Bush never acknowledged not showing up for any training for more than
six months, and when that was revealed, Bush’s story changed to a claim that he
had “made up” the time.
It
is this refusal to acknowledge error and failure, and the creation of new
narratives when the facts are completely inconsistent with his original story,
that is most disturbing about George W. Bush.
Just as he created a myth with regard to his military career, Bush
created a myth to justify the invasion of Iraq. And just as Bush’s explanation of his military career changed as
contrary facts were disclosed, so have Bush’s justifications for the Iraq
invasion changed as information contrary to his justifications is exposed.
America
cannot afford four more years of someone who is so incapable of facing the
truth about his own failures, and that of his administration.
To
understand the rules concerning substitute training, one must first understand
the purpose of the Air National Guard itself, and the purpose of the scheduled
monthly training known as UTAs.
From 10 USC 262
From 10 USC 672
Units
needed to be able to function as units.
It was expected that Bush’s unit, the 111th Fighter Interceptor Squadron
of the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group, would be able to function no
differently than an active duty Air Force Fighter Interceptor Squadron in the
event of a national emergency.
From 32 USC 502
Within
the Air Reserve Forces, these 48 periods of “drill and instruction” were called
Unit Training Assemblies (UTAs). Each
UTA had to be at least four hours long, and UTA weekends were scheduled once a
month. (Two UTAs were held on both Saturday and Sunday).
From 32 USC 501
Guardsmen
that had a Military Service Obligation (MSO) were required to attend at
least 90% of the UTAs. Under certain
circumstances, “substitute training” could be performed, but it was expected
that such training would fulfill the same purpose as attendance at the
scheduled monthly UTAs.
(Note: For a complete explanation of other aspects
of the Payroll Reports, see Understanding Points and Payroll Record PART I PAYROLL RECORDS.
)
At the bottom of most of the payroll records that
were released is a section that contains lines of nearly incomprehensible data,
that upon examination, turns out to be the data that was entered via punch
cards into the payroll system itself.
And it is within these lines of data that the fraudulent nature of
Bush’s service is revealed.
Transaction Data Lines from Bush’s First Quarter 1973 Payroll Report…”
There
are a number of different line formats within this section of the payroll
reports, one of which corresponds to UTAs or
“substitute training” performed.
“Top line” of Transaction
Data from Bush’s First Quarter 1973 Payroll Report 731011310104N2011320104N1011410105N2011420105NN
Between
the “73” and the final “N” are found four distinct 11 character groupings of
data, each of which corresponds to a one of the four scheduled UTAs in a
specific month. Table A1 shows how this
data is broken down in this fashion
TABLE A1: Breakdown of UTA Transaction Data Lines 73 1011310104N 2011320104N 1011410105N 2011420105N N Year First
UTA Second
UTA Third
UTA Fourth
UTA Duty type
Each of these four UTA sections can be further broken down, into two main sections, corresponding to the date and time of the scheduled UTA, and the date and time when the UTA training or “substitute training” was done. (At the end of each section is a letter “N”, which (presumably) indicates that this training was not eligible for the flight status pay differential available to ANG members who were on flight status.)
TABLE A2: Breakdown of “First UTA” section from
Table A1 SCHEDULED UTA DATA TRAINING PERFORMED DATA Flight
pay designator PERIOD MONTH DAY PERIOD MONTH DAY 1 01 13 1 01 04 N AM drill January 13th AM drill January 4th No
flight pay
Table A2 shows how the data is broken down into these sections, and how the data in those sections can be further broken down to correspond to the time of the drill (“1”=morning training, “2”=afternoon training), the month of the scheduled/performed training, and the day of the scheduled/performed training.
The
data in Table A2 can be translated as “George Bush was scheduled to show up in
Texas on the morning of January 13, to train with his unit, but instead
performed “substitute training” on the
morning of January 4.”
The
payroll records also contain “Transaction Information” section, which provided
details regarding each payment that was made to Bush. This information includes not just how much Bush was paid and
what was deducted from his earnings, but the days and periods of training for
which Bush was being paid, and the date that Bush was paid.
Transaction Information from
Bush’s First Quarter 1973 Payroll Report…”
Detail 1 from Transaction
Information Section (October Training) 1 721028
2 721028 1
721029 2 721029
Detail 2 From Transaction
In-formation Section (Check date) . 730104
By
combining the information from Detail 1
and Detail 2, we can determine how long it took for Bush to get paid for any
training that he is credited with performing.
There
is one set of documents authorizing Bush to perform “substitute training” in Alabama, but ironically, Bush never
performed the “substitute training”
that was he was authorized to perform.
But even this set of authorizing documents is incomplete.
These
documents consist of
·
a request from Bush to perform “equivalent duty” with the 187th
Tactical Reconnaissance Group, dated September 5, 1972. Bush requests authorization to perform
“substitute training” for UTAs he planned on missing in September, October, and
November.
·
a page
with two indorsements [13],
dated Sept. 6 and Sept. 8. The first is
from Lt. Col. Jerry Killian, Bush’s Squadron Commander, and second is from Col.
Bobby Hodges, Commander of the TXANG’s 147rh Fighter Interceptor Group
·
an
(unsigned) third indorsement dated Sept 11,
this one from Major Charles Shoemaker, Chief of Personnel for TXANG, acting on
behalf of the head of the Texas Air National Guard
·
a page with a fifth indorsement from Kenneth Lott, Chief of ALANG
Personnel Branch dated Sept. 15, 1972, as well as a sixth indorsement (dated
Sept. 19) from 2nd Lieutenant David
McCutcheon, the Air Admin. and Training Officer for the Alabama Air National
Guard. A seventh indorsement (dated
Sept. 21), again from Charles Shoemake, is on this page as well, and indicates
that the authorization to train was forwarded to the 147th FIG for action.
Once
the 147th had received all of this paperwork, it would have contacted the 187th
to authorize it to create the necessary AF Form 40a’s that would be used to
certify that Bush had performed his training.
(The Form 40a’s were probably the reason why members of the Alabama Air
National Guard remember looking for Bush, because he had been expected.)
There
is no “fourth indorsement”, but based upon the routing of the third
indorsement, that document would have come from the office of the Alabama
Adjutant General’s office.
Why
paperwork related to “substitute training” that was not performed was
maintained in Bush’s files, when there is no documentation of the “substitute
training” for which Bush was paid among the papers that were released by the
White House, remains unexplained.
Even
more mysterious is the fact that all of the documents in Bush’s personnel file
that are related to the time he spent in Alabama are concerned with thing that
did not happen. In additional to the
authorization for “substitute training” that Bush did not attend, the only
other documents concerning the “Alabama year” are the ones related to the
request for a transfer to the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron that was turned down
by the Air Force.
When
the data from the payroll records is compared with other documents found in the
Bush files, it is apparent that TXANG officials were covering up for Bush.
It
only took 22 days for the payment to Bush for training that he supposedly
performed in April 1973. This is 14
days less than the shortest period it took for Bush to get paid for the
training he supposedly did in Alabama, which suggests that Bush did the
training with his TXANG unit.
TABLE A3: Breakdown of “First UTA Period” from
April 73 UTA Weekend (see Detail 3 above) YEAR SCHEDULED UTA DATA TRAINING PERFORMED DATA Flight
pay designator PERIOD MONTH DAY PERIOD MONTH DAY 73 1 04 07 1 04 07 N 1973 AM drill April 7th AM drill April 7th No
flight pay
If Bush did his UTA training at Ellington Air Force Base with his unit, there is simply no way that his superior officers could not have seen him. Bush would have been required to report to those officers on two separate days, and sign in and out on the UTA roster for that weekend on each day.
There
is no documentation showing that Bush was approved for substitute duty for
April 1973, nor has either Bush or his spokespeople ever suggested that Bush
did not train with his TXANG unit that month.
The
data from the payroll records thus suggests that either Bush’s TXANG superiors
were lying on Bush’s “Training Evaluation”, or Bush was paid and given point
credit for attendance at mandatory training when he didn’t show up.
In
either case, the “April Mystery” can lead to only one conclusion: TXANG officials were covering up for Bush,
and were willing to falsify records in order to do so. And although The “April Mystery” does not
prove that Bush was paid for training that he never performed, it does show
that TXANG officials were perfectly willing to ignore regulations when it came
to George W. Bush.
Bush
is also credited with training on his units UTA weekends in May, June, and
July. But although a reward was offered
to anyone who could prove that Bush returned to Ellington after his “Alabama
year”, no one has come forward to claim that money. In fact, the person who would have to process Bush’s checks (the
personnel officer for the 147th FIG) has stated that he thought Bush finished
his final year in Alabama[14].
Finally,
it should be noted that this “substitute training” was supposedly done on July
16-19, 1973, and that July’s UTA training was supposedly done on July
21-22. However, Bush received payment
for July 21-22 on August 7, and was not paid until eight days later (August 15)
for training supposedly done days before the July UTAs.
The variance in the amount of time it took Bush to get paid for training raises serious questions. Based on this pay data (as well as the “15 days in advance” policy discussed above) it is difficult to believe that Bush received the necessary advance approvals to perform “substitute training” for the UTAs for which he was credited. Indeed, given these factors, it is not unlikely that Bush never did any of this “substitute training” at all.
[2] Under current regulations, the “Appropriate Duty” category no longer exists, and “Equivalent Training” is the term used to denote all training done as a substitute for scheduled UTAs that are missed.
[3] Although the time limits mentioned in the regulations are found in a section of the Air Reserve Personnel Manual specific to procedures for the Air Force Reserves, under United States law the “discipline, including training, of the Air National Guard shall conform to that of the Air Force.” (32 USC 501a) Throughout the policies, regulations, and statutes concerning training, the only significant differences between the USAFR and the ANG were the procedures to be followed, and not the training requirements themselves. Currently, ANG regulations allow “substitute training” to be done no more than 30 days in advance of, or after, a scheduled UTA, however, requirements for training have been considerably relaxed over the last 30 years. Thus it is more than reasonable to assume that Bush could only be authorized to perform “substitute training” no more than 15 days in advance of his scheduled UTAs.
[4] The “substitute training” credited for the February 1973 UTAs was not performed on consecutive days, but on January 6 and 8, 1973.
[6] The “retention/retirement year” was an annual period that began on the anniversary of an ANG member’s enlistment. Bush enlisted on May 27, 1968, and his “retirement/retention year” began on May 27 and ended on May 26 in the following year.
[7] April 6 is only 27 days after March 10. However, although substitute training was permitted up until 30 days after a scheduled UTA, all substitute training also had to be accomplished prior to the next monthly UTA. Because the April UTAs were scheduled for the weekend of April 7 and 8, 1973, under the regulations Bush would have had to complete substitute training for March UTAs by April 6.
[8] Walter V. Robinson, 1 Year Gap in Bush’s Guard Duty, Boston Globe, 5/23/2000
[9] http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1073076/posts?page=1,50 (Turnipseed’s comments are fully consistent with Air Force policies. However,.this is based on the account of a member of Free Republic.com, a site not known for its credibility.)
[10] Walter V. Robinson, 1 Year Gap in Bush’s Guard Duty, Boston Globe, 5/23/2000
[11] Hirschman, Dave and Basu, Moni; Memories place Bush in Alabama if records don’t , Atlanta Journal Constitution, 2/13/04
[12]
The White House claims that Bush only needed to get 50 points per “retirement year”. This was simply not the case. See BUSH'S ATTENDANCE
OBLIGATIONS AS A MEMBER OF THE US MILITARY.
[13] The term “indorsement” is
used to connote a formal approval or sanction of paperwork in the
military. Its meaning is equivalent to
“endorsement”.
[14] “…Ellington's top personnel officer at the time, retired Colonel Rufus G. Martin, said he had believed that First Lieutenant Bush completed his final year of service in Alabama.”, Walter V. Robinson, 1 Year Gap in Bush’s Guard Duty, Boston Globe, 5/23/2000
