PLAIN ENGLISH
SUMMARY: Under the laws, regulations and policies
governing the Air National Guard, Bush had a six year obligation to serve in
the United States Military. That obligation
included Bush’s attendance at 12 scheduled monthly drill weekend each year with
his Texas National Guard unit that lasted at least eight hours each day. He also had to perform at least 15 days of
“active duty” with his unit above and beyond his weekend drills. Under very restricted conditions, Bush could
make up missed drills, but he had to receive permission in writing for making
up every missed drill, and if he missed more than four of those drills, he was
supposed to be punished by being called to active duty, and would lose his
draft deferment. The White House’s
claim that Bush had “fulfilled his duty” was based on a criteria that was
completely and utterly irrelevant to the question of whether Bush had done so,
and was so transparently irrelevant that it could most accurately be described
as a flat out lie.
[Notes: 1) Virtually every military regulation or
policy has exceptions, and many have exceptions to exceptions. Requirements, policies and procedures can
vary based on such relatively minor details such as whether one had 17 or 18 or
19 or 20 years of service, whether one worked for the Federal government, or
how many dependents one had. In order
to simplify things, references pertaining to the laws, regulations, and
policies of the US Military will be restricted to those rules to which Bush was
subject, unless otherwise specified.
2) Links to scanned
versions of the US Statutes, Code of Federal Regulations, and Air Force
Policies cited in this article can be found on the Source Documents page.}
Any discussion of
Bush’s military service record must begin with an understanding of nature of
the originals of the policies and regulations governing Bush’s tenure in the
Texas Air National Guard.
The basis of
virtually every regulation, policy, and procedure to which Bush was subject has
it origins in the statutory law (United States Code, or USC). Those laws determine, often with great
specificity, what was expected of Bush, and what was to be done should he fail
to meet expectations. These laws would
also delegate authority to the President, the Secretary of Defense, or other
officials to create regulations (found in the Code of Federal Regulations, or
CFR) necessary to implement those law, and these regulations had the same force
and power as the laws from which they were derived.
The CFR would
further refine the laws, creating more specific regulations regarding policies
and procedures while using much of the same language found in the
statutes. (The CFR was also the means
by which statutory law is “consolidated”; that is, that the CFR defined the
means by which statutes found in various parts of the US Code could be
implemented in a manner consistent with all of the relevant statutes.) These
regulations would also delegate authority to others, such as the Secretary of
the Air Force, to further refine and define the requirements found in the CFR
within the meaning and intent of the original statutory law on which the
regulations were based.
Although many of
the “rules” cited here are “Air Force Regulations” or “Air Force Reserve
Regulations”, those rules always have a basis in both regulatory and statutory
law, and were promulgated with the authority provided by law. Thus, when a claim is made that Bush
violated a certain regulation, it must always be kept in mind that what he was
doing was no less than defying the laws of the United States of America.
The explication of
Bush’s attendance obligation found below is designed not merely to be a
catalogue of rules and regulations, but also to provide an example of how all
the rules and regulations described herein are directly related to statutory
and regulatory law.
It should be
emphasized that although this discussion deals almost exclusively with
“attendance” issues, as with any job more was required of a National Guard
member than “just showing up.” In
addition to his attendance obligations, Bush was required to accomplish
periodic physical examinations.
And the drills and
training that Bush was required to attend had specific training objectives and
agendas. Sitting in someone’s office
for eight hours, paging through magazines and “safety reports”, did not
constitute “satisfactory participation” in the required drills. However, such judgments are often
subjective; while an objective assessment can be made to determine if the
records say that Bush “showed up” in a manner consistent with “fulfilling his
duty” as defined by the laws and regulations governing attendance to which he
was subject.
It should also be
noted that “pay” and “point credits” for drills do not prove that Bush attended
those drills. Given the information
that can be mined from the Bush records, skepticism is not unwarranted with
regard to whether Bush showed up, or simply got paid for showing up.
Finally, it should
be noted that this is not a hypercritical analysis of the failure to
occasionally follow precise regulations.
The “rules” that were broken were major, and the violations too numerous
to count. These regulations will,
however, be “endlessly” cited, but only to demonstrate that there is no way to
argue that the major, significant violations were clearly and unequivocally
prohibited, and that there is no possible way to argue that Bush “fulfilled his
duty” to the United States of America.
Before one can
discuss Bush’s attendance obligations as a member of the US Military, a number
of key terms and abbreviations need to be defined.
RULES: A
term that will be used as a catch-all for the statutes, regulations, policies
and procedures of the US Military.
·
AIR RESERVE FORCES (ARF):
“…consists of the United States Air Force Reserve (USARF)[1] and the Air National Guard of the United States
(ANGUS) units and members[2].” Although USARF and ANGUS were two distinct
organizations, the overall rules governing both were ARF rules. Because Federal law mandated that
the training and discipline of all Air Force components be consistent, [32
USC 501(a)] distinctions between USARF and ANGUS rules generally were minor,
and primarily concerned with procedural issues.
MILITARY SERVICE OBLIGATION (MSO): “The period that an individual must serve as a member of the
Regular and/or Reserve component of the Armed Forces as required by law.[3]” “The law” in Bush’s case, was 10 USC 651, the statute
under which Bush entered the service in 1968.
At that time, the statute imposed as six year MSO on Bush which expired
on May 26, 1974. In many
cases, whether an airman had fulfilled his MSO determined to which set of
regulations and policies he was subject.
Bush’s enlistment contract and other documents affirm his six year
obligation.


From the Military Selective Service
Act of 1967
50 App USC 456(c)(2)(A)(iii)
READY RESERVE: “…consists of units and members of the
Reserve components liable for AD [Active Duty] in time of war, in time of
national emergency declared by the Congress or by the President, or when
otherwise authorized by law[4]” In general, the “Ready Reserve” were
expected to be “ready” to be called to active duty at a moments notice, and to
be able to function both individually and as military units with the same level
of skill and competence as the “Regular Armed Forces.” All National Guard Members were members of
the “Ready Reserve”, because all were required to have a “Ready Reserve Service
Agreement (see below). Additionally,
the Selective Service Act of 1967, under which Bush received his draft deferred
status, required Bush to remain a member of the Ready Reserve for six years in
order to maintain his draft deferment.
·
READY
RESERVE SERVICE AGREEMENT[5] (RRSA): A contract signed by
a Reservists/Guardsman agreeing to remain a member of the “Ready Reserve” for a
defined period. “The member waives his
right to transfer to the Standby Reserve under any criteria under which he may
be qualified on the date he signs the agreement….[6]” Bush signed a Ready Reserve
Service Agreement on December 1, 1969[7],
upon completing his pilot training and being assigned to TXANG that obligated
him to remain a member of the Ready Reserve until May 26, 1974.

·
OBLIGOR: “A
member of the ARF who has an MSO[8].
The distinction
between a “Military Service Obligation” (MSO) and a “Ready Reserve Service
Agreement”(RRSA) is that an MSO defined the length of a duty obligation only
for those officers who had an “unfulfilled” MSO, while an RRSA obligated all
National Guard members to abide by the terms of service applicable to Ready
Reserve members. Whether one had an
unfulfilled MSO often dictated which “Ready Reserve” rule applied, and what
procedures were followed and penalties applied when violations occurred.
Because Bush’s MSO
and RRSA terminated on the same date, “MSO” will be used to designate Bush’s
obligation both under statute (MSO) and under contract (RRSA), and “obligor” will
be used in describing Bush as someone with both an “unfulfilled MSO” and a
contractual commitment to maintain his readiness under his RRSA. “Obligor” should also be understood to mean
someone who “has not completed 24 months of Active Duty or done Active Duty in
combat”. These two distinctions also
had an impact on the rules to which Bush was subject. (Bush had only 607 active duty days—slightly more than 20 months[9]---when
he left for Alabama, and only 632 days---slightly over 21 months---when he resigned
from TXANG and went to Boston.)
THE STANDBY
RESERVE consisted of individuals
who were not required to be available for active duty in the event of a
National Emergency unless Congress specifically authorized the mobilization of
the Standby Reserve in response to that emergency. A member with a RRSA and an MSO could only get into the Standby
Reserve if they met very specific criteria, such as extreme personal hardship
if they were called to active duty. Attending
graduate school did not constitute extreme personal hardship; if a member of
the Ready Reserve was called to active duty because of a national emergency, he
could request that his activation be delayed until the end of the semester, and
under Air Force policy, that delay would generally be granted.
Under both the statutes of the United States, and the
contract that he had signed, Bush had a six year obligation to the US
Military. But that obligation entailed more than just
showing up whenever and wherever he felt like it. It also entailed specifically defined levels of participation in
training and drills. These defined
obligations were based on general provisions of statutory law, and were refined
under statutory authority in the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR). The CFR provisions were refined and defined
even further under ARF policies and regulations.
Under Air Force regulations, Bush was required to per
attend the same “one weekend per month, plus 15 days each year” that has been
the standard for Guard members for decades[10]. 32 USC 502
(see excerpt, above)
set the minimal standard requiring Bush to “assemble for drill and
instruction…at least 48 times each year’ and (2) participate in training…at
least 15 days each year.” (This specific statutory provision is
referenced in the Selective Service Act – see above).
(Although the statute itself appears someone ambiguous, and could be seen as concerned with the obligation of National Guard units to hold assemblies and training, the mandatory nature of the assemblies themselves was established in 10 USC 270, which refers to all members of the “Ready Reserve”, as well as in other parts of the Statutes, such as the Selective Service Act cited above.)
This is demonstrated
in the Federal Code of Regulations (Title
32, Part 101.3), which referenced 32 USC 502(a) in defining “Reserve
Participation” and the “Criteria for Satisfactory Performance.” The CFR used nearly identical language
(“assemble for drill and instruction…at least 48 times each year’ and (ii)
participate in training…at least 15 days each year.”) in defining the “Training
requirements” for “Reserve Participation” required of National Guard “Members.”
Of particular note is the provision concerning the “Criteria for Satisfactory performance.” This section not only makes clear that a member must show up for “scheduled drills”[11], it places limits on the number of on “unexcused absences” (“does not exceed ten percent of scheduled drills and training periods”),(emphasis added).
The CFR also makes it clear that no one has the authority to “authorize” Bush to miss more than four “assemblies”, or to authorize any absence for the sake of the convenience of a member. The defining of an “excused absence” as absences based on “circumstances beyond the individual’s control”, the stipulating that absences must be “made up by performance of equivalent drills or training periods”, and the defining “unexcused absence” as anything other than that which met the definition of “excused absence”, make it clear that a Guard member’s absence is not merely a question of Air Force policy, but of United States law.
There is no question that Bush was well aware of the nature and extent of this legal obligation to the US Military. Bush consistently attended the mandatory training periods of his unit from the time he was assigned to the 111th Fighter/Interceptor Squadron of TXANG, and those which he did not attend were “made up” with “equivalent training. [12]”
And, in addition to the documents previously cited confirming Bush’s obligations, he also signed a Statement of Understanding detailing the same 48 drills, 15 days of “active duty” that appears in the statutes and codes..

Air Force Reserve
regulations were even more specific than those provided by US Statutory Law and
the Code of Federal Regulations. Within
the context provided above, the primary requirement to understanding the
regulations regarding attendance is an understanding of the terminology used by
the Air Force in detailing these regulations.
TRAINING
CATEGORY “A” REQUIREMENTS[13]
TRAINING
CATEGORY “A” was the
training category for a member who was part of the “…Ready Reserve and is assigned to an ANGUS wing, group, or
separate unit headquarters staff of State…”[14] Bush,
like all members of the Air National Guard, was in Training Category “A”.
ACTIVE DUTY (AD) “Full time duty in the active military
service of the United States…A general term applied to all active military
service…”[15]
ACTIVE DUTY FOR
TRAINING (ACDUTRA): “A tour
of AD Reserve Training under orders which provides for automatic reversion to
the Air Reserve Forces not on AD when the specified period of AD is completed.”[16]
ANACDUTRA [Annual Active Duty Training] refers
specifically to duty which fulfills the requirement found in CFR Title 32 Part
101 to “participate in training at encampment, maneuvers, or other exercises at
least fifteen (15) days a year.”
INACTIVE DUTY
FOR TRAINING (INACDUTRA) is
“…training performed by members of the Air Reserve Forces while not on active
duty for which point credit is authorized…”[17]
There were various kinds of INACDUTRA, but
the most important was the “prescribed” periods of training known as UNIT
TRAINING ASSEMBLY (UTA) “An authorized and scheduled period of training,
duty, or instruction, including test alerts, conducted by USARF Training
Category A [see above} units organized to serve as units in the event of
mobilization.”[18] Each UTA was at least four hours in
length. UTA training was scheduled for
one weekend each month[19]
, with each weekend consisting of four UTAs.
(2 UTA periods each on Saturday and Sunday).
Both UTAs and
ANACDUTRA refer specifically to the training required in the statute (32 USC
502) cited above. The training mandated
by the statute was performed by Guard members as a unit (“each company,
battery, squadron, and detachment”),
and was designed to not only enhance the skills of an individual member,
but to enhance the effectiveness of the larger group as a fighting unit.
Participation in
both UTAs and ANACDUTRA was mandatory.
Unlike the Army National Guard, which generally required ANACDUTRA to be
performed on 15 consecutive days, for practical reasons (ANG flying units had
far fewer planes available than pilots) the Air National Guard was more
flexible. Unit commanders were expected
to consult with ANG members with regard to scheduling ANACDUTRA, and ANACDUTRA
could be split over several periods.
But a Guardsman was
expected to be available for all UTA weekends, and if you missed a weekend (or
part of it), it had to be for a very good reason. If a UTA was missed, it could be made up in one of two ways:
APPROPRIATE
DUTY (APDY) which was duty
“which a member performs instead of attending a scheduled UTA when absence is
from cause beyond their control, such as illness or other personal hardship,”[20]
or
EQUIVALENT
TRAINING (EQT) which was
duty “that may be authorized for unit members unable to attend scheduled UTAs
while they are on active duty in support of the active establishment”[21]
A
UTA can only be made up because of hardship, or because a unit member was on active duty[22]. Additionally, the “member must perform the periods of APDY or EQT within 15 days immediately before, or 30 days immediately after the regularly scheduled UTA, but before the next month’s first scheduled UTA (whichever Is earlier) and within the same fiscal year”[23]
There are also a
number of other forms of INACDUTRA, including TRAINING PERIOD (TP),
which is an authorized period of training, duty, or instruction performed by
members as individuals”[24]
and ADDITIONAL FLYING TRAINING PERIOD (AFTP) which is an “authorized
additional period of flying training”[25] However, neither TPs nor AFTPs were part of
the mandatory training delineated under the Statutes and Codes, and could not
be used as substitutes for UTAs.
All Inactive Duty
Training (as well as Active Duty Training), had to be authorized in advance[26]
by a member’s unit commander or his designee[27]
in order to qualify for pay and/or participation points. A Guardsman could not simply show up
wherever and/or whenever he wished, and get credit for training. Other than UTAs themselves, all forms of Inactive
Duty Training required specific individual permission, and the performance of all
training had to be certified in writing.[28]
In 1977, the fiscal
year (FY) ran from July 1 through June 30.
(e.g FY 71-72 ran from July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972). In the case of Active Duty Training, this
meant that by June 30th of each year members were required to have
performed 15 days of ANACDUTRA within the last 12 months. Failing to do so meant that an obligor had
not met the definition of “satisfactory performance” and “satisfactory
participation”.
However, the
requirement for Unit Training Assemblies was not determined in this manner,
that is, one did not wait until the end of the fiscal year to determine if a
member met the criteria for “satisfactory performance.” . Once a obligor had accumulated more
than four “unexcused absences” within a fiscal year, he had failed to meet
the requirements as a member of the Air National Guard. The fiscal year was only[29] the basis from which one started to count to
determine if a member had more than four “unexcused absences” within a
year. The best way to explain this is
by examining what was done when a member missed a UTA.
Attendance at UTAs was
supposed to be closely monitored by the National Guard unit. Once a member missed three UTAs which
were not “made up”, he was supposed to be counseled. If he was not available for counseling, a personal letter was to
be sent.[30]

The contents of the
letter, (and presumably, the counseling) included[31]
·
A notification
that the absence had been recorded
·
A reminder
that the member had been counseled regarding his training requirement (when he
enlisted) and a reiteration of those requirements
·
A description
of the consequences of failing to meet those requirements
·
An explanation
of the procedures necessary to “make up” the absence, including a requirement
that all applications to be allowed to performed “Appropriate Duty” in lieu of
the missed training period be made in writing, with documentation verify the
reason for the absence
·
An order (“You
are directed to report for training at the next scheduled training assembly”)
to appear for the next UTA, with the date, time, and place of that training
specified.
Once it was
determined that an officer had five or more unexcused absences, he was supposed
to be processed for order to active duty.[32] Unlike enlisted personnel of the Air National
Guard[33],
who were to be processed for active duty through the state ANG of which they
were a member, ANG officers were supposed to be reported directly to the Air
Force (US Air Force Military Personnel Center at Randolph Air Force Base in
Texas) for processing.[34]
These procedures
make it clear that ANG members were required to maintain a satisfactory
attendance records at all times, and not simply “make up” missed UTAs
whenever they felt like it. Because the
procedural steps involved in calling someone to active duty are irrelevant to
the question of Bush’s attendance obligations, they will be discussed in a
later section.
The provisions
cited above have their origins in the Title 10 (Secretary of Defense) and Title
32 (National Defense) of the United States Code. Bush was also subject to the provisions of the Selective Service
Act of 1967, which appeared in Title 50 Sections 451 to 473 of the US
Code. Provisions relating to the
exemption for service in the National Guard were found in 50 USC 456 (c), under
“Reserve Component Exemptions” Under
this law, National Guard member remained exempt from being called to active
duty through the Selective Service System “so long as he serves satisfactorily
as a member of an organized unit of such Reserve or National Guard.” If a member “fails to serve satisfactorily
during his obligated period of service” he was subject to “being inducted into
the armed force of which such reserve component is a part, prior to the
selection and induction of other persons liable therefore.”
What this meant is
that if a member with an MSO did not “serve satisfactorily” in the Guard, he
could be “drafted” through the Selective Service System on a “priority”
basis.. This was a process similar to,
but distinct from, receiving orders through the Air Force Reserve to perform
active duty for not attending the required number of drills.
Under Air Force
regulations, the “draft-deferred” status of National Guard members with an
unfulfilled Military Service Obligation had to be “confirmed” each year[35]. A form DD44 was to be completed stating
either “Annual Report—continues to participate satisfactorily”[36],
or stating “Failed to satisfactorily perform training duties, certified for and
retained awaiting priority induction…“.
In the later case item 12i” was also to be “checked and complete[d]…to
show that the individual ‘ceased to serve satisfactorily’”[37]
The DD44 was
prepared in triplicate, with the “original” going to the member’s local Selective
Service Board, with one copy going to his unit’s personnel office and another
to the Master Personnel Records Group.[38] The period covered by the annual report was
September 15 through September 14 of each year, and all annual DD44s were to be
in the mail by October 15th[39].
The Selective
Service Act itself does not include a definition of “serve satisfactorily” or
provide criteria for “failure to serve satisfactorily.” However, because the instructions for
filling out the form include terminology found in the laws, codes, and
regulations cited above (c.f. “Criteria
for Satisfactory Performance” in CFR title 32, section 101.3(b)) and treats
“failed to satisfactorily perform training duties” with “ceased to serve
satisfactorily”, we must assume that the criteria used to determine
“satisfactory service” was the same “48 scheduled drill and 15 days of active
duty” found above.
Thus, if a member
had more than four unexcused absences within either fiscal year included within
the “September 15 through September 14” time frame, they should have been
reported for “priority induction” through their local Selective Service
Board. If a member had more than four
unexcused absences in both fiscal years covered by the DD44 period, they of
course should also have been reported for “priority induction.[40]
The claim made by the White House that, because Bush had gotten 50 points that he had “fulfilled his duty”, was completely false.
This falsehood
probably has its origins in statutes such as 10 USC 1002, which
stipulates that there is a certain number of points that must be “attained”
each year to remain in “active status”, and that the number of points required
cannot be more than 50.
The falsehood completely ignores rather obvious considerations such as
· in order to maintain “active status” one must also “conform to such other standards and qualifications as the Secretary concerned may prescribe”
· As someone who had sought and received a draft deferment when he joined the Air National Guard, and as someone with an MSO and a Ready Reserve Service Agreement, Bush was required to do far more than simply maintain “active status.”
As noted above, Bush signed up under the provisions of specific Statutory law which mandated that he “satisfactorily participate” for six years as member of the Ready Reserve. This was not some arbitrary requirement. The existence of “reserves” such as the Air National Guard played a major role in the planning for America’s national security needs. While hundreds of thousands of Americans were being drafted to serve in Vietnam, and tens of thousands of Americans were dying in Southeast Asia, Bush had been afforded the privilege to jump to the head of the waiting list for the Texas Air National Guard, and been allowed trained at great taxpayer expense as a pilot.
These opportunities, however, did incur the specific obligations described above. For the White House to pretend that Bush was not required to serve six years as a member of the Ready Reserve, that he was not required to train with his unit 12 weekends plus 15 days per year, and that he was not required to maintain his qualifications to fulfill the job he had been assigned, is to insult every person who has ever served in the Armed Forces with honor and distinction.
[1] The acronym for the United States Air Forces Reserves was previously AFRes, and some sections of the regulation and policy manuals that had not been recently updated still used the old acronym.
[2] AFM 35-3, Para 2-9 (June 1, 1970)
[3] AFM 35-3, Para 2-28 (June 1, 1970)
[4] AFM 35-3, Para 2-38 (June 1, 1970)
[5] document at http://users.snip.net/~awol/docs/ReadyReserve.htm
[6] AFM 35-3, Para 2-39 (June 1, 1970)
[7] Bush probably had signed another Ready Reserve Service Agreement when he enlisted. In general, each time a Guardsman was reassigned, he signed a new RRSA, and the old one was voided.
[8] AFM 35-3, Para 2-34 (June 1, 1970)
[9] based on the “30 day month” currently used by the Air Force in calculating years of active duty service for retirement, as found in 10 USC 12733.
[10] the current
version of 32 USC 502 (a) contains nearly identical language to that of the
statutes from 1973. see footnote 12.
[11] “scheduled drills and training” is deemed separate and distinct from the “15 days of active duty” as can be shown in the distinction made in this section itself concerning the definition of “excused absence.” Thus, in order to satisfy the “Criteria for Satisfactory Performance” on could not have an unexcused absence at more than four (“more than ten percent” of 48) of the drills scheduled “each year”.
[12] Based on his “points” records, in his first full “points” year (1970-71) with TXANG, Bush attended 10 weekends of scheduled drills, made up one weekend, and missed one full weekend. In his first eleven months of his second full “ points” year, Bush either attended or made up all but one four hour drill period. The twelfth month was May, 1972, when he had left for Alabama. (It would probably be more accurate to state that Bush’s consistently attended for the first 18 months, after that, his record becomes somewhat irregular, but still within the “acceptable” limits. It should also be noted that there are minor discrepancies between the payroll records and points records for the two year period at TXANG in question. In that period Bush was paid for two periods of duty for which he did not receive points, but this was most likely a clerical error.)
[13] AFM 35-3, Table 3-1, Note 1a (ARF Assignments) (June 1, 1970)
[14] AFM 35-3,
Table 3-1, Rule 1 (June 1, 1970)
[15] AFM 35-3, Para 2-3 (June 1, 1970)
[16] AFM 35-3, Para 2-4 (June 1, 1970)
[17] AFM 35-3, Para 2-22 (June 1, 1970)
[18] AFM 35-3, Para 2-22b (June 1, 1970)
[19] Some ARF units would schedule two UTA weekends in November or January, to avoid conflicts with members holiday schedules. However, the documents indicate that TXANG units did not follow this practice during Bush’s tenure.
[20] AFM 35-3, Para 2-22b (1) (June 1, 1970)
[21] AFM 35-3, Para 2-22b (2) (June 1, 1970)
[22] Beginning in 1978 appropriations bills allowed for only one weekend (four periods) of paid Equivalent Training per year. This policy was formalized in the statutes in 1984. (37 USC 206(e)). This was likely done to increase participation in UTAs themselves, and members were probably scheduling “active duty” during UTA weekends that had no relationship to the purpose of EQTs, which was to allow substitute duty when on active duty in support of the active establishment.
[23] AFM 35-3 Table 16-3 (January 14, 1970)
[24] AFM 35-3, Para 2-22a (June 1, 1970)
[25] AFM 35-3, Para 2-22c (June 1, 1970)
[26] AFM 35-3, para 20-5(a)(6) (June 1 1970)
[27] AFM 35-3, para 20-9 (June 1 1970)
[28] AFM 35-3, para 20-8 (June 1 1970), also see AFM 35-3 para 20-10 (June 1, 1970)
[29] the fiscal year also played a role in determining when an “absence”from a UTA could be “made up” so that it could be excused. You had to “make up” all absences not only within the period 15 days before to 30 days after the scheduled UTA, but within the fiscal year of the UTA that was missed. This requirement, however, is not relevant to controversies surrounding Bush’s records.
[30] AFM 35-3, para 14-7(c) (June 1, 1970)
[31] AFM 35-3, figure 14-3 (June 1, 1970)
[32] “A member…who fails to satisfactorily participate will be ordered to active duty if he has not served on AD or ACDUTRA for 24 months.” AFM 35-3, para 14-5 (June 1, 1970)
[33] AFM 35-3, para 14-5(b) (June 1, 1970)
[34] AFM 35-3, para 14-5(c) (June 1, 1970)
[35] AFM 35-3 para 14-12 (June 1, 1970)
[36] AFM 35-3 para 14-15b (June 1, 1970)
[37] AFM 35-3 figure 14-5 (June 1, 1970)
[38] AFM 35-3 para 14-16 (June 1, 1970) It should be noted that, based on the regulations to which I have access, relatively few forms were designated specifically to be sent to the Master Personnel Records Group, suggesting that there should be copies of all of Bush’s DD44s in his “personnel file.” It should also be noted that there are three DD44s in the records released by the White House. The earlier two were printed forms from 1968 and 1969. The third is a computer generated form certifying Bush’s “satisfactory participation” as of September 15, 1971. All three can be seen at http://www.usatoday.com/news/bushdocs/9-Miscellaneous.pdf (pages 10-12).
[39] AFM 35-3 para 14-14c. (June 1, 1970)
[40] No DD44 was released by the White House for the annual periods ending September 15, 1973, and most notably, September 15, 1972.