NOTE: THIS IS A WORKING DRAFT FOR COMMENT, AND IS
PART OF THE AWOL PROJECT, A LARGE
SERIES OF ARTICLES EXAMINING BUSH’S MILITARY RECORDS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE
FEDERAL STATUTES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REGULATIONS, AND AIR FORCE POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES OF THAT ERA. COMMENTS,
CORRECTIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO awol@glcq.com.
THE ALABAMA TRANSFER SCAM
HOW
GEORGE W. BUSH TRIED, AND FAILED, TO CON THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE INTO
RELIEVING HIM OF HIS TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
Contrary to the spin put out by the White House (and
endlessly repeated by the mainstream media) Bush was never transferred to the
9921st Air Reserve
Squadron in Alabama. Nor was this “transfer
request” an attempt to find somewhere to do training temporarily while Bush
worked on an Alabama political campaign in 1972. Instead, Bush was running a scam designed to completely sever his
relationship with the Air National Guard, and eliminate the last two years of
his obligation to train and serve as a pilot, by joining a unit that had no
training, and for which Bush was specifically ineligible.
BUSH’S OBLIGATIONS AS A MEMBER OF THE US ARMED FORCES
THE 9921st AIR RESERVE SQUADRON
THE TRANSFER DOCUMENTS
THE MISSING
“ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF COUNSELLING”
THE “INDORSEMENT” OF LT. COL. REESE BRICKEN
THE REJECTION OF
THE TRANSFER REQUEST
CODA: “ATTENTION IS INVITED TO BASIC COMMUNICATION”
THE TRANSFER THAT NEVER HAPPENED
On
the morning of Saturday, May 20th, 1972, the members of the 147
Fighter Interceptor Group at Ellington Air Force Base in Houston, Texas
assembled for the first day of one of their mandatory monthly training
weekends. George W. Bush didn’t show
up. Nor did he show up the next day,
May 21st.
Three
days later Bush signed a document signaling his intent to completely abandon
the Texas Air National Guard, and instead join the Air Force Reserves as a
member of the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron in Alabama. But the 9921st was not an
ordinary Air Force Reserves unit. It
was, in fact, a special kind of “unit” whose members were not required to do
any training whatsoever.
When
George Bush joined the Texas Air National Guard and was enrolled in pilot
training, he promised to train, and serve, as an F-102 pilot until May 26,
1974. Bush became a fully qualified
F-102 pilot on June 20th, 1970, and after serving less than half the
time he had promised to serve as a fully trained pilot, George W. Bush was
looking for a way out.
Bush
wasn’t eligible to join the 9921st, of course. The law did not allow him to join a
non-training unit. And Bush obviously
knew this. But he tried to scam his way
into the 9921st anyway.
The
following article is based on the documents concerning this “transfer request”
as analyzed from the perspective of the then-current Statutory laws, Department
of Defense Regulations, and United States Air Force policies and procedures
governing transfers between its reserve components[1]. This analysis explodes a number of myths,
among them:
MYTH:
Bush was requesting a temporary training assignment when he submitted his
“Request for Reassignment” to the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron.
FACT: The purpose of the document submitted was a
complete reassignment, involving cutting all ties to, and eliminating all
commitments to the Texas Air National Guard.
MYTH:
Bush was approved for transfer to the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron,
and he didn’t have to train with his Texas unit until that transfer was
overturned by the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC).
FACT:
No orders reassigning Bush to the 9921st ARS were ever issued, and
absent such orders for Bush no transfer had ever taken place. Until Bush received those orders, he remained
assigned to the Texas Air National Guard, and maintained his training
requirement.
MYTH: Bush did not know he was not eligible for a
transfer to the 9921st ARS.
(This, of course, is more than just a myth. It is Bush’s “official” position, as expressed by his spokesman
during the 2000 presidential election campaign[2]).
FACT: The documents themselves prove that Bush was
fully aware that, as a member of the 9921st ARS, he would be unable
to fulfill the requirements established for him under United States Law, and
Air Force policy.
What
George W. Bush was attempting to do was run a scam. He was trying to find a way to “legally desert” his post, by
gaming the system under which transfers to Air Reserve Squadrons were
processed. In the meantime, while
waiting for his scam to come to fruition, Bush blew off months of training that
he was required to do under the law, and didn’t even bother getting the medical
examination required of all pilots, whether they had planes to fly or not.
As
we now know, Bush never got the orders that would allow him to forget about
fulfilling his obligations to the United States Armed Forces. His little transfer scam didn’t work, and he
should have been showing up for training, and maintaining his qualifications as
a pilot, throughout the Spring and Summer of 1972.
Article 85 is one of the “punitive articles” of the UCMJ.
And Article 85 has a name. It is “Desertion.”
George W. Bush was deemed ineligible for the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron because he could not meet his obligations and training requirements with that unit.
Bush’s obligations as a member of the Armed Forces were established by the statutory laws of that period. As provided within the statutes, those obligations included:
1) Serving in the United States Military for six years
2) Being available for immediate call to active duty in his assigned position in the event of a national security emergency for that six year period.
3) Fulfilling the requirements of his assigned position by maintaining his qualifications for that position by participating in mandatory training with his unit.
From 10 USC 262
In pursuit of this purpose, the Air National Guard and
Air Force Reserves were organized into units which were expected to fulfill
specific tasks as part of the Air Force when that unit was mobilized. These units (and the individuals assigned to
these units) were designated the “Selected Reserves”.
Each
member of each Air National Guard unit was assigned a specific Air Force
Specialty Code (AFSC) which defined
the role that individual would play in the fulfillment of that unit’s
mission.
Bush’s
AFSC was 1125D, that of an F-102 Fighter/Interceptor Pilot. Bush was expected to be fully trained and
qualified not merely to fly an F-102, but to do so as a member of a squadron of
F-102s that was able to perform as a unit.
To
fulfill this need, Bush’s training requirements included 48 periods of
“inactive duty” training with his unit (known as Unit Training Assemblies or
UTAs) and 15 days of “active duty” training with that unit.
These
training requirements placed Bush in Training Category A, and Bush could
only be assigned to a Training Category A unit, that is, a unit which provided
the training required of Bush. Bush could
also only be assigned to a unit which provided training for his specific “Air
Force Specialty”.
The
nature and extent of every Guardsman’s training requirements was part of the
knowledge base of each Guardsman. Bush
was expected to fully understand these requirements, and as a commissioned
officer it is virtually impossible that he was not aware of them.
A
key point that is often missed in the discussion of the failed transfer to the
9921st Air Reserve Squadron is that this was an attempt by Bush to be
permanently reassigned to an Alabama unit that required no training. It was not, as many people believe, a
temporary request for “light duty” while he was working on a political
campaign.
In
essence, this transfer request can best be described as an attempt to find a
way to “legally desert” the United States Armed Forces. By eliminating Bush’s requirement to train
as a pilot with an organized unit of the National Guard, it virtually
eliminated any possibility that Bush would be mobilized in the event of a
national emergency. In terms of its impact
on national security readiness, there is no difference between Bush’s attempt
to avoid training through an illegitimate transfer, and going permanently
AWOL.
To
understand why the documents surrounding this “transfer” are so suspect, it is
useful to compare them to the procedures used under “normal” circumstances,
i.e. the procedures by which individuals could transfer between units of the “Selected Reserves.” [4].
1)
The
Guardsman announces that he will need to relocate
2)
His
personnel officer explains the relocation policies and procedures to him
3)
The
Guardsman signs an acknowledgement that he has received the relocation
counseling.
4)
The
personnel officer gives the Guardsman a certification of satisfactory
participate, which he will need to get approval for a transfer
5)
The
Guardsman locates an appropriate Ready Reserve position with a new unit, and
submits a “Transfer Request Form” (Form 1288) and a new “Ready Reserve Service
Agreement (Form 1644) , along with the certification of satisfactory
participation, to the “receiving unit”
6)
7)
The
Guardsman gives the Form 1288, Form 1644, the certification of an appropriate available
position, and a letter of resignation to his current unit commander.
8)
The
unit commander indorses the request, and forwards it to the State Adjutant
General.
9)
The
Adjutant General approves the request, and discharges the Guardsman from the
Air National Guard to the Air Force Reserves.
10)
The
Air Force Reserves assigns the former Guardsman to his new unit.
It
should be noted that, as long as the paperwork was in order and there was a
suitable vacancy, approval of the transfer was practically automatic. Under Air Force policy, when someone
relocated, unit commanders had very little discretion to reject the transfer
request, and it does not appear that the Air Force would raise objections to
any such transfers providing all parties agreed, and all requirements were
met.
The
fact that Bush used a process by which “normal” transfers took place between
“Selected Reserve” units in order to get reassigned to the 9921st Air Reserve
Squadron is evidence of the intentionally fraudulent nature of the attempted
transfer itself.
The
9921st Air Reserve Squadron was a “Training Category G unit”, and were not
considered part of the Selected Reserves.
Members of Training Category “G” were Reservists who had completed their
Military Service Obligation, and were categorized as “Reinforcement
Designees”.
Unlike
“Mobilization Augmentees”, Reinforcement Designees were not assigned to
specific units with which they would serve in the event of a national security
emergency. In general, Training Category
G Air Reserve Squadrons consisted of individuals with specific civilian
professional qualifications (lawyers, doctors, clergy) which would be needed in
the event of a mobilization, but whose job within the military did not require
the constant “military” training required of combat personnel. Training Category G Air Reserve Squadrons
also included Federal office holders, and key Federal employees.[5]
Air
Reserve Squadrons such as the 9921st were known as “postal units”, because
their members would maintain their qualifications as Reservists through
correspondence and extension courses.
In other words, they would keep apprised of changes in Air Force
policies and procedures relevant to their positions, while maintaining the
skills necessary for their AFSC through their civilian professions.
The only documents concerning Bush’s attempted transfer to the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron are the Transfer Request Form, and two memos from TXANG officials approving of the transfer. There is no statement of counseling, no certification of satisfactory performance, no certification of a suitable vacancy, no letter of resignation, no discharge papers, no discharge orders, and no reassignment orders. These missing documents, however, are as relevant to the story behind Bush’s transfer request as the documents that do exist, because those documents were an essential part of the procedures concerning transfers.
Whenever a Guardsman decided to relocate to an area where
he could no longer train with his assigned unit, he was required to sign a statement acknowledging that it was his responsibility to
locate a new Reserve Forces unit with which to serve[6].
The fact that the counseling statement is missing is not relevant in and of itself. What is relevant, however, are the policies and procedures that are followed before that statement is signed.
According to statements made by Rufus Martin, the personnel officer of the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group, Bush did notify his unit that he was moving to Alabama, and discussed his options with Martin. In other words, the policies and procedures which would lead to a statement being signed were followed.
It cannot be affirmatively determined when Bush spoke to Martin, but it was probably on or before May 15, 1972. That is the date that Bush’s superior officers claimed that Bush abandoned the Texas Air National Guard, (‘cleared this base on 15 May, 1972”). Bush would never again show up in Texas to do the job he was assigned to do.[7]
Martin said in an
interview that he knew Bush wasn't eligible for
the 9921st, an unpaid, general training squadron that met once a week to
hear lectures on first aid and the like. "However," he said,
"I thought it was worth a try. . . . It was the least participation of
any type of unit." But Air Force Reserve officials rejected the
assignment, saying Bush had two more years of military obligations and was
ineligible for a reserve squadron that had nothing to do with flying
airplanes. Bush spokesman Dan Bartlett said Bush didn't know that
when he applied. George Lardner Jr.and Howard Kurtz, Democrats:
Bush Let Guard Down; Gore Surrogates Revive Issue of Apparent Laxity in
Candidate's Military Service, Washington Post, 11/3/2000
Martin’s statement makes it clear that Bush solicited
advice from Martin on how to avoid his training requirements. It is absurd to assume that Martin would
recommend a unit with “the least participation” without being asked by Bush for
that kind of recommendation. It is
equally absurd to suggest that Martin would recommend the 9921st, knowing Bush
was ineligible and that the reassignment had little chance of being approved,
without telling Bush that success was unlikely.[8]
Excerpted from Bush's Transfer Request Form
Excerpted from Bush's Transfer Request Form
The address Bush uses, however, is not the address of his (then) current residence. It is, instead, the address found on Bush’s discharge papers under “civilian occupation”, where he listed his most recent employer as the Campaign Management firm of Allison & Travalen.
Excerpt from Bush's TXANG Discharge
Form (NGB-22)
Insofar as Bush was being employed solely to work on the Blount campaign, it is clear that Bush blew off his requirement that he include a “permanent address” on this transfer form. This, of course, would have facilitated any attempt to “disappear” and forget about his training obligation if Bush had succeeded in his plans to transfer to the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron.
Excerpted from Bush's Transfer Request Form
Excerpted from Bush's Transfer Request Form
Is it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to believe that Bush was not aware of his own AFSC. The deliberate entry of an incorrect and obsolete Air Force Specialty Code is consistent with the fact that Bush was trying to transfer to a unit where he would not be required to train. The odds of Bush being able to scam his way into a non-training unit would be enhanced if his specific skill set was one which was no longer useful to the Air Force, and his AFSC was one for which no actual training was available.
And there is one further key piece of evidence that shows that Bush was deliberately trying to scam his way into a non-training position after less than four years in the US Armed Forces, despite the fact that he had agreed to maintain his readiness for mobilization by training for six full years.
DETAIL from Bush's Transfer Request Form
DETAIL from Bush's Transfer Request Form
Excerpt from Bush's Transfer Request Form
Excerpted from Bush's 1970-71 Training
Report
Given these facts, it is extremely difficult to credit the statement made on Bush’s behalf that “he didn’t know that [he was ineligible for the 9921st] when he applied.”
THE “INDORSEMENT” OF LT. COL. REESE BRICKEN
A highly credulous partisan support of George W. Bush might still believe that there was some truth in Dan Bartlett’s statement regarding Bush’s lack of knowledge that he was ineligible for transfer to the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron when he submitted his transfer request form to that unit. However, the language contained in the “indorsement” Bush received from the commander of the 9921st, Lt. Col Reese Bricken (retired) makes it clear that Bush knew he was ineligible for the transfer before he submitted his request to the Texas Air National Guard.
In his comments, Bricken says “You already understand that this is a Training Category G, Pay Group None, Reserve Section MM proposition.” With this language, Bricken affirms that by May 26th, 1972 Bush was fully aware that he could not meet his training requirements were he to transfer to the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron.[10] With exactly two years left of his six year Military Service Obligation, Bush was told that the unit to which he wanted to transfer would not allow him to fulfill the commitment that he made upon entering the Air National Guard. Yet Bush pressed on to accomplish this transfer.
THE
MISSING “CERTIFICATION OF A SUITABLE VACANCY”
In order for Bush to apply to TXANG for permission to transfer to a different unit, he was required to provide a “certfication of a suitable vacancy.” In essence, this would have been a statement that said that the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron’s assigned unit strength specifically included F-102 pilots, and that there was an F-102 slot that was not taken. However, Air Reserve Squadrons had no “assigned unit strength” for specific AFSCs as such, and thus it was impossible for their to be a vacancy which could be certified.[11] (See below)
Rufus
T. Martin, the Personnel Officer who has acknowledged knowing that Bush was
ineligible for an assignment to the 9921st ARS, nevertheless “approved” Bush’s
request on June 2, 1972 on behalf of the commander of the 147th Fighter
Interceptor Group, Col. Bobby W. Hodges.
(It should be noted, however, that there is no indication that either
Hodges, or Bush’s immediate superior officer, Lt. Col Jerry Killian, was ever
actually aware of, let alone approved of, this clearly irregular transfer
request.)
Martin
uses language (“Request this organization be notified on date of appointment.”)
that assumes that the transfer request will be successful, and that there is
nothing unusual about the request In
essence, it appears that Martin and Bush were literally acting like a couple of
“con men”---projecting confidence in order to pull off this scam.
Excerpted from From AFM 35-3, Chapter 11, Para 10
Nevertheless,
the extremely irregular nature of this transfer request makes it clear that
there were people in powerful places in TXANG who were as willing (if not
eager) to get Bush out of TXANG all together as Bush was to abandon his
commitment to the United States Air Force.
There is simply no other explanation for why TXANG would allow someone
whom it had described as “an exceptionally fine young pilot” who was “mature
beyond his age and experience” and who was a “natural leader but..also a good
follower of military discipline” who “performed in an outstanding manner” and
had “outstanding growth potential”[12]
would simply be allowed to leave TXANG to transfer to a unit where the Air
Force would be unable to take advantage of these sterling qualities.
Unfortunately
for Bush, his attempt to “legally desert” did not work. ARPC caught the attempted scam, and rejected
it in no uncertain terms.
It
apparently took nearly two months from the date of Shoemake’s indorsement of
the transfer request for the Air Reserve Personnel Center to reject the
request. (The rejection letter itself
lacks a typewritten date, however, a memo (see below) which refers to the
rejection letter references it at being dated July 31, 1972). The reason for the delay cannot not be positively
determined; however one detail suggests that part of the delay was based on the
nature of the scam.
Reese
Bricken’s indorsement noted that the 9921st Air Reserve Squadron was a “Reserve
Section MM proposition.” When Shoemake sent
the transfer documents, they were directed to “ARPC/MM”. Although the actual nature of “Reserve
Section MM” has not been determined[13],
however it is likely to have been a section to which “reinforcement designees”
were assigned. At least some of the
delay in ARPC’s rejection may be attributed to “ARPC/MM” being the wrong place
for transfer requests concerning someone like Bush, a member of the “Selected
Reserves” with an outstanding Military Service Obligation, would be handled. (The APRC’s response directs any further
communication to “DPRMA”, and DRP was the acronym for the Directorate of
Personnel Resources. “MA” may have been
the proper “section” of ARPC to which Bush’s transfer request should have been
sent.).
The
final document in the Bush files that refers to the “transfer scam” is a memo
sent by Charles Shoemake on behalf of the Adjutant General to the 147th
F.I.G. The subject of the memo is the
transfer request rejection letter from ARPC, and the message is short, and to
the point: “Attention is invited to
basic communication.”
Given
the context in which this memo appears, it can only be interpreted as a rebuke
to the 147th Air Reserve Squadron leadership.
They had forwarded a clearly bogus request for a transfer, which
Shoemake had apparently signed on behalf of the Adjutant General without checking. As a result, Shoemake looked quite foolish
for “indorsing” the attempt of an officer with a Military Service Obligation to
get himself out of his commitment to the United States Armed Forces.
The
media, with the tacit encouragement of the White House, consistently refers to
the sequence of events represented by the documents cited above as a transfer
that was “approved” then later “overturned” by the Air Force. But there is absolutely no evidence
suggesting that the steps necessary to actually effect a transfer were ever
taken. There is no letter of
resignation, no discharge form, and no evidence that any orders were ever
promulgated pursuant to this “transfer.”
This was not a transfer that took place, and then was reversed, it was a
transfer that never happened.
Furthermore,
documents on which such a reassignment would be noted show that no such
transfer ever occurred. If a transfer
had been effected and then reversed, Bush’s quarterly payroll reports would
have reflected that it had occurred, yet there is nothing in those reports that
suggest that Bush was ever reassigned from the authority of TXANG.
Bush’s
“chronological listing of service” on his AF Form 11 also provides evidence
that no such transfer ever occurred.
There is no entry between the one showing how many days of active duty
training Bush completed in his
“retirement year” which ended on May 26, 1972 and his discharge from the
Texas Air National Guard on October 1, 1973.
Because
no transfer had ever occurred, Bush remained obligated to train as a pilot with
the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group. Yet
for five straight months, Bush did no training whatsoever.
Bush’s
failure to train, and his intention to find a way to “legally desert”, were
signaled even before he attempted to scam the system and get reassigned to a
non-training unit of the Air Force Reserves.
The weekend before Bush even applied for the transfer (May 20 and 21,
1972) the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group of TXANG met for its mandatory
monthly training weekend. George W.
Bush was not there. He had already
“cleared the base” on the prior Monday, and there is no indication that he made
any effort whatsoever to perform substitute training for these missed
drills. Bush simply blew off his
obligation to train.
When
Bush signed his transfer request form, he acknowledged that he had to notify
his employer of his status as a member of the United States Air Reserve
Forces. It is absurd to suggest that,
had Bush requested the time to fulfill his training requirement, that his new
employer would have denied that request.
Excerpt from Bush's Transfer Request Form
Bush
was working for a Republican candidate for the United States Senate who had
just won his party’s primary earlier in May.
Unlike today, when candidates start running for re-election the day
after an election, in 1972, there was actually a “campaign season” that began
on Labor Day in September. Certainly,
the summer months between the Alabama Republican Primary and the beginning of
September would be occupied by planning and preparation for the General
Election campaign.
But
it is just as certain that a Republican Senate candidate would honor the
request of one of his staffers for two days off so that the staffer could
fulfill his commitment to the United States Armed Forces. There is simply no other explanation for
Bush’s failure to accomplish his mandatory training for May 1972 than the fact
that Bush decided that he wasn’t going to be bothered with training that month.
Bush
never received orders transferring him to the 9921st, which would have relieved
him of his obligation to train one weekend each month with his Texas unit, or
at least perform substitute training elsewhere. But Bush never showed up for any training in June, or July, or
August, nor is there anything that suggests he attempted to get authorization
to perform substitute training.
When,
more than a month after getting word that he would not be receiving
reassignment orders (September 5, 1972),
Bush finally does request permission to perform substitute training with
the 187th Tactical Reconnaissance Group at Dannelly Air Force Base in
Montgomery Alabama, he does not even request permission to make up for any of
the months of training that he missed.
Indeed,
it was during this period that Bush further demonstrated his intention to
“legally desert” by not bothering to get the flight physical required of
everyone with a pilot’s Air Force Specialty Code. It was irrelevant whether or not there were planes for Bush to
fly, as long as he maintained the job title of “pilot” he was required to
maintain his qualifications for that title, or request reassignment to a
non-flying position. Bush did neither, further
exhibiting his intention to blow off the last two years of his service.
When
Bush finally finished his pilot training on June 20, 1970 he still had 1436
days left on his Military Service Obligation, during which he was expected to
perform as an F-102 pilot. Bush’s last
day of service before losing his flight status was April 16, 1972, which was
666 days from the date on which Bush became a pilot. Bush had 770 more days of his Military Service Obligation
remaining at that point, but from April 17, 1972 he did nothing to accomplish
what was required of him as a member of the United States Armed Forces.
There
can be little doubt that, when Bush left for Alabama in May 1972, he had no
intention of ever doing anything to fulfill his commitment to the United States
of America. Instead, he tried to “scam”
his way into a position where he wouldn’t have to do any training, ignored the
training he was required to do while “awaiting reassignment orders”, made no
effort to make up the training that was missed when he learned that the scam
hadn’t worked, and refused to maintain his qualifications for the job he was
supposed to be performing. He waited
over a month before requesting permission to perform substitute training for
September, October, and November of 1972, but did not show on the dates he was
permitted to train with the 187th Tac
Recon Group.
Other
than the fact that he was paid for training, there is no evidence that he ever
performed any training whatsoever after April 16, 1972. There is no evidence that he was ever authorized
to perform any of the substitute training he is supposed to have accomplished
in Alabama, and no one, not even the personnel officer that would have had to
process the paperwork that accompanied six months worth of monthly training,
recall him training in Alabama. And his
Texas unit was unable to supply a training report from Alabama that was
demanded by the Air Force. Supposedly
Bush, who had returned to Houston, was given permission to not show up to train
with his Texas unit as the law said he should in January, February, and March
1973, but was instead authorized by both TXANG and the Alabama Air National
Guard to sit in someone’s office at Dannelly Air Force base for six days in
January reading safety manuals for eight hours each day.
Nor
does anyone remember Bush returning to train in Texas. Although Bush is credited with training on
April 7 and 8, 1973, the same weekend that TXANG’s 147th F.I.G. held their
mandatory training for April, his immediate superior officer denied that Bush
reported to him for training on those days.
Bush was also paid for training on three additional weekends (May, June,
and July of 1973) when the 147th F.I.G.assembled as a group for monthly
training. Yet not one remembers him
being there. Rufus Martin stated in
2000 that he though Bush was in Alabama throughout his final year in the Air
National Guard, and Bobby Hodges said that same year that if Bush had shown up
at Ellington, he would have required Bush to resume flying the F-102.
We
are being asked to believe that one of the best pilots in the Texas Air
National Guard goes away for a year, then returns on weekends when the rest of
his unit is present, signs in and signs out on the unit training roster but
does no flying whatsoever, and that no one remembers him coming back, or what
he was doing on those weekends.
And
we are supposed to believe all this happened solely because someone typed some
numbers on some punch cards which were submitted to the military payroll
system.
This is being written after three weeks of a media feeding frenzy brought about
